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Incorporating Complexities into the Explanation of Decision Making: 
Strategy Simulations and an Empirical Test 
Nathaniel Decker 
ABSTRACT 
This investigation of risky decision making models the standard forced-choice 
two outcome lottery task by incorporating elements of complexity present in real-world 
decision making.  Potential decision criteria such as current wealth and quality of life 
information were made available to examine the influence of time-dependent contextual 
cues on decision strategy selection, since previous investigations of decision making have 
not included specific contextual cues that would allow for people to use complex or 
“dynamic” decision strategies. 
Two studies explored simulated decision strategies requiring more or less 
complexity.     Results suggest that strategies using dynamic, time-dependent criteria 
provide important advantages over simpler strategies.  Also, as ‘aspirations’ become 
closer to the most likely outcome and as trajectories include a larger margin of previous 
experiences, there is more control over improvements to the likelihood of ending up in an 
extremely good place over an extremely bad place.  Certain changes to the decision 
environment seem to affect the accuracy of dynamic decision strategies, which in turn 
can help or hinder their effectiveness. 
 vii 
As a test of convergence, an empirical test was conducted to compare actual 
decision strategy use with simulated decision strategies.  Two distinctly different decision 
tasks were used: one required only passive choices between two lotteries and the other 
required active changes to a given lottery situation.  Information about lottery outcomes, 
current wealth, and quality of life were provided to participants to provide additional 
context to the decision environment. 
Participants seemed to be using a variety of different strategies, including 
strategies that focus on dynamic information.  Simple risk policies were often very good 
at describing risk preferences, though a subset of participants were relying on a complex 
decision strategies.  There were also systematic differences in dynamic decision strategy 
usage.  The combination of simulations and the empirical investigation elucidate the 
advantages to exploring risk preferences with attention to different decision strategies in 
specific environments, especially including more complex or “dynamic” decision 
strategies.
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Introduction 
Over the past several years, explanations of decision making have been 
predominantly utility-based.  Some advancement has been made by Prospect Theory, 
which incorporates several psychological phenomena such as reference dependence and 
loss aversion, though still ultimately using a utility-type curve to explain many risky 
choice phenomena.  Other recent advances in the study of decision making have provided 
for deviations from the prediction of a utility-based theory through a compartmentalized 
application of various heuristics or biases.  Research from this “heuristics and biases” 
perspective has become particularly narrow, generally focusing on singular deviations 
from the standard utility-based models. 
 This study takes a broader approach to the understanding of decision making.  
Instead of relying predominantly on utility-based explanations, it may be worthwhile to 
also take into account the more complex elements from the real world.  There are several 
fundamental complexities to the study of decision making in the real world.   After 
decades of research, three of the most obvious or important fundamental complexities 
that arise repeatedly are vantage point dependencies, goal dependencies, and aspirations. 
Several models have made attempts to account for some or all of  these complexities, 
including the Prospect Theory model (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), Aspiration Level 
and Goal Trajectory models (Schneider & Lopes, 1986; Lopes, 1987, 1996), and models 
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using a dynamic systems approach (Busemeyer, 2004). These models have various ways 
of accounting for the three fundamental complexities. 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze these fundamental complexities in 
contextually rich environments by synthesizing several different elements of existing 
models.  Two different approaches were taken to better understanding the role of 
complexities in decision making.  First, simulations were created to look at the idealized 
or statistical aspects of hypothesized decision strategies. Using a Monte Carlo approach, 
the simulations yield outcome distributions with properties that are helpful in 
understanding the potential impact of different strategies.  A second approach used an 
experimental decision environment enhanced with contextual information, including 
time-dependent or “dynamic” context.  In addition, a convergent methods approach 
comparing the simulations with empirical tests is used to look for common patterns and 
explanations in the behavior of actual participants.  
In order to better understand the fundamental complexities mentioned previously 
and how they relate to the larger question of decision-making, a brief overview of 
vantage point dependency, goal dependency, and aspiration levels will be provided, as 
well as a discussion of how they relate to current approaches to understanding risky 
decision making.  A thorough explanation of the current study will then be introduced, 
along with the findings and implications reached. 
Vantage Point Dependency 
In the context of this project, “vantage point” dependency refers to reference 
dependence as it relates to a reference point.  The term “reference dependence” is the 
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notion that a participant’s response to a given problem varies due to the perspective of the 
participant.  The simplest utility models (Bernoulli, 1738/1954) predict that people will 
evaluate risks differently depending on how far away the outcomes are from the reference 
point of zero on a utility curve (shown in Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: An example of Bernoulli’s (1738/1954) simple utility curve. 
 
These models work by assuming a systematic relationship between the actual 
value of a commodity/lottery and the subjective experience that lottery elicits.  Typically, 
the presumed relationship, as shown in Figure 1, is that a given increase in objective 
value is experienced as smaller the farther away the values are from zero.  For instance, 
when presented a 50/50 chance of $0 or $100, the difference in objective value between 
the two options ($100) elicits a larger ‘subjective value’ than the difference between a 
50/50 chance of $500 or $600.  This notion of a marginally decreasing relationship 
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between objective and subjective value is important in that it introduced a way for 
Bernoulli to explain why people are not neutral to things with the same change in 
expected value.  This helps to illustrate the importance of a reference point for explaining 
behavior. 
However, with the Prospect Theory model and the creation of the S-shaped utility 
function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) shown in Figure 2, participants can evaluate 
choices differently depending on the valence of the decision, or direction (positive of 
negative) from the reference point, in addition to the distance from the reference point.  
In Prospect Theory, the individual first converts the values in the decision problem into 
valences: either gains, which are choices that result in a “good” or better state than the 
current reference point; or losses, which are choices that result in a “bad” or worse state 
than the current reference point.  These gains or losses are then weighted by their 
“subjective value.”  This allows the valence of the decision problem to have an impact on 
the outcome of the decision. 
 
Figure 2: S-shaped Utility Curve (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
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Reference dependence is commonly demonstrated in phenomenon known as 
“framing effects.”  Tversky and Kahneman (1981) proposed that decision makers use the 
valence of information as a critical reference point.  Framing effects are predicted when a 
decision maker is presented with a choice between a riskless option and a risky option 
under circumstances that could be considered a loss (e.g., people dying, losing money) 
versus a gain (e.g., people being saved, gaining money).   Tversky and Kahneman (1981) 
found that participants are likely to choose the riskier option when they adopt a loss 
perspective and are likely to choose the riskless option when facing what seems like a 
gain.  Reference dependence suggests that the subjective experience elicited by a lottery 
depends on the perception of the individual, and as a result, a model built on only these 
simple utility-type curves can gauge subjective experience as it relates to the reference 
point of the participant.  Reference dependence is important in the explanation of 
decision-making because it requires that the reference point being taken into account be 
used to make distinctions depending on the direction of the choice outcomes from a 
neutral point.  
Goal Dependency 
Vantage point dependencies of distance and direction from zero represent static 
versions of reference dependence.  “Goal trajectories” provide an additional dynamic 
dimension of the reliance on reference points when making decisions.  The reference 
point can be similar to those previously stated, but in addition to evaluating risky choices 
based on distance from zero (as with Utility theory) and direction from zero (as with 
Prospect theory), decision makers may also take into account the experience of previous 
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outcomes over time as they relate to the expectancy of future outcomes.  People are 
influenced by previous successes and failures, such that previous successes create a 
tendency to view the current goal as continuing their successes by approaching a more 
positive state, whereas previous failures create a tendency to view the current goal as 
preventing their future failures by avoiding a more negative state.    From this 
perspective, goals are formed based on information about previous outcomes as well as 
information about the outcome trajectory from the previous decisions to the current 
decision.  This explanation would operate consistent with the promotion and prevention 
focus described by Regulatory Focus theory (Higgins, 1998).  The goal trajectory 
approach takes into account the decision maker’s previous experiences as well as their 
future expectations.  Goals are set with respect to whether the decision maker has 
recently experienced improvements or decrements in outcomes.  In short, when people 
make decisions, goal trajectories are using ‘where they are’ with respect to ‘where they 
were’ to make inferences about ‘where they want to be.’ 
The construct of goal trajectories is inspired by a clever study developed by 
McKenzie and Nelson (2003).  McKenzie and Nelson investigated framing effects using 
a glass of water at half capacity that was described as having just previously been either 
empty or full.  They found that a majority of the participants interpreted a filling glass as 
“half full” and an emptying glass as “half empty.”  McKenzie and Nelson conclude that 
frames and framing effects are useful in providing additional contextual information 
about the situation.  Participants evaluate glasses differently by using the inferences about 
the trajectory of the water in the glass.  Apparently, this information led participants to 
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believe the glass was either filling or emptying until it was at half capacity.  Hence 
people interpret events based on outcome trajectories.   
Schneider and colleagues (2005) elaborated on this idea by incorporating outcome 
trajectories into a risky decision making task.  They hypothesized that people’s goals 
would be highly sensitive to outcome trajectory information.  She devised a task that 
makes outcome trajectory and goal related information more obvious. Participants start 
off in a risky situation and are given the opportunity to try to improve the situation, and in 
doing so either decrease or increase the amount of risk they are facing.  Schneider argued 
that this is a more ecologically valid paradigm than the standard risky choice paradigm, 
wherein participants behave counter intuitively by taking risks when they are in loss 
situations but playing it safe for gains.  Because the new paradigm places the decision 
within an ongoing dynamic context, preferences should be more intuitive as a result (e.g., 
not taking big risks when facing losses).  Indeed, Schneider and colleagues found that 
preferences were very different from the standard risky choice paradigm.  Instead, 
Schneider and colleagues found that people tend to play it safe for both gains and losses, 
but especially for losses. 
Schneider and colleagues (2006) then later used her new paradigm to determine if 
and how outcome trajectories affect the experience of decision-making.  She argued that 
people’s affective reactions would differ predictably given the overall valence of 
experiences across a series of decisions.  She argues that basic adaptive mechanisms may 
lead to negative affect when losing and positive affect when winning as a functional way 
to assess and respond to longer-term consequences.  Specifically, when one is losing over 
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a period of time, protective measures are in order; however, when one is winning over a 
period of time, one can afford to be more open to a variety of options.   
People have often argued that framing effects should be ignored, but Schneider 
argues that it is reasonable for people to respond differently to starting with nothing and 
winning up to a given value versus starting off with a lot and losing down to the same 
value.  This is exactly what Schneider and colleagues (2006) found; affect changed 
markedly as participants continued through a series of lotteries depending on whether 
they experienced a positive or negative trend across the entire series (e.g., how much 
money they received at the beginning of the task + how much they earned [positive trend] 
or lost [negative trend] during the task).  These affective differences in this context seem 
to operate in a fashion consistent with Damasio’s (1995) somatic marker hypothesis.  The 
somatic marker hypothesis focuses on somatosensory reactions to stimuli over a period of 
time as a means for gauging a choice option’s usefulness.  All else equal, changes in 
affective response are likely to signal improvements or declines in one’s position and are 
thus adaptive in more natural scenarios.  Goal trajectories pose a problem for decision 
researchers because trajectory information varies depending on the participants’ 
evaluation of the lottery scenario, previous lotteries in a series, etc.  As a result, 
individual participants’ decision patterns may vary depending on their different 
interpretations of the current lottery state relative to previous lotteries and, perhaps more 
importantly, previous outcomes.   
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Aspirations about the Future 
In the same vein as the previously mentioned goal trajectories, Lopes (1981) and 
others have argued that making a series of decisions can have different meanings and 
consequences than making a single decision with the same expected value.  Lopes 
addressed a comment by Samuelson (1963) in which he argued with a colleague that if 
one play of a lottery was not desirable, then multiple plays of that lottery also couldn’t be 
rationally considered preferable.  Lopes (1981) argued that lotteries could be interpreted 
differently depending on the number of plays given.  When given a large number of 
chances to play, people are much more likely to end up close to the expected value of 
outcomes.  For example, if given a 50/50 chance between $0 and $5, after a single play, 
there is no chance of ending up with the average value $2.50, only either $0 or $5; after 
ten plays however, there is a relatively good chance of ending up at or near the expected 
value of $25.  The central limit theorem would dictate that the greater the number in the 
series of games, the higher the likelihood that the experienced cumulative outcome will 
be close to the expected value.  Hence, a single play does not capture the change in 
outcome distributions associated with a series of events.  In short, a large number of 
chances to play a particular gamble yield a higher likelihood to arrive at some multiple of 
the expected value such that the standard deviation of outcomes is smaller compared to 
fewer plays of the same gamble. 
Lopes (1981) goes on to argue that it is reasonable for people to base their 
decisions on something other than expectations, given this difference in experienced 
outcomes between long run and short run gambles.  While vantage point dependencies 
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and goal dependencies reflect the importance of the reference point for encoding the size 
of values, their valence, and their impact with respect to recent outcomes and current 
goals, there may be individual differences that cannot be explained relative to the 
reference point, but further depend on the implicit goals of participants.  Lopes and 
Schneider have long argued that decision strategies are based less on momentary 
considerations such as the expected values of gambles and more on the future 
implications of an increasingly time-dependent decision environment.  To that end, Lopes 
(1987) proposed a dual criterion strategy to address how aspirations serve as threshold 
values.   
SP/A theory (Lopes, 1987) involves two decision criteria in formulating a 
decision:  the first is the security/potential component, which suggests that motivations 
correspond with how influential the good or bad outcomes are.  Specifically, the 
‘security’ modality instantiates that the worse outcome is more influential than the better 
outcome, while the ‘potential’ modality instantiates that the better outcome is more 
influential than the worse outcome.  This component functions in a dispositional way, 
dissimilar to the s-shaped utility function suggested by the Prospect Theory model 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  Instead of each valence representing a different 
evaluation of objective value, the particular motivation to remain secure to avoid large 
losses (as with the “negative” realm) or achieve some large potential gain (as with the 
“positive” realm) exist with relative simultaneity, wherein the most prevalent motivation 
is adopted. 
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The second component of the SP/A theory is the aspiration level component.  This 
is a situational variable, such that the environment introduces opportunities or constraints, 
which in turn influence choices.  Lopes (1987) presents three potential sources of 
aspiration levels; direct assessment of what is reasonable to look forward to, direct 
contextual influence of other alternatives in the choice set, and outside contextual 
influences, such as the rules of a particular decision task.  Lopes (1987) suggests that as 
people make decisions in the real world, often relative to some persistent goal, (e.g., 
making enough to pay the rent; other financial, often noncompensatory goals) they may 
change their fiscal strategy depending on how they perceive themselves to be doing 
relative to that goal.  This should be an important aspect of decision modeling because it 
suggests that an effective model must account for strategy changes as a result of longer-
term goals and aspirations.  The aspiration level phenomenon is important because it 
extends the evaluation of risky decision-making beyond a comparison of expected values.   
For the purpose of this investigation, we are interested in the noncompensatory 
processing which can result from the aspiration level phenomenon.  Noncompensatory 
decision criteria are non-additive, all-or-nothing determinants of choice that relate to 
distinctions people make in their environment (Paine, 1975).  While compensatory 
criteria allow for other criteria to tradeoff such that being good with one characteristic 
(great miles per gallon in a car) can compensate for being bad with another characteristic 
(a smaller interior), noncompensatory decision criterion do not consider other criteria if 
the conditions of the noncompensatory criteria are not met.  Noncompensatory criteria 
work like a gateway, determining whether one needs to consider the other criteria; if the 
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conditions for a noncompensatory criterion are met for a given subset of choices, then 
those choices are evaluated using the remaining criteria.  The choice subset that does not 
meet the conditions of the noncompensatory criterion is ignored.  Nonlinearity can often 
arise from situations involving noncompensatory processing, which can create problems 
for linear models of decision-making.   
For example, if the decision problem involved buying a car, one 
noncompensatory decision strategy would be to not buy a car if it were red.  Regardless 
of the other criteria that can be used in the act of choosing a car, if it is red, it will not be 
purchased.  When a participant changes their strategy by ignoring all of the other 
characteristics of a choice for a given lottery, that is considered a noncompensatory 
decision strategy, because the “other criteria” (e.g., the valence of the lottery, previous 
outcomes, etc.) cannot affect the participant’s choice when they are in the given situation.  
When decision strategies are attached to aspiration levels, the aspiration threshold 
influences the strategy by creating a discontinuity or nonlinearity.  As a result, additive 
linear models can not account for changes in strategy for situations that “do” versus “do 
not” meet the aspiration, because these models would require unwieldy “heuristics,” 
addendums, and exceptions to explain why one chose from a limited subset of choices 
given one’s aspirations as they relate to the particular environmental information. 
Modeling Decision Complexity: Dynamic systems 
Partly in an attempt to account for nonlinear and noncompensatory criteria and 
partly to explain the problem associated with how simple processes and entities can 
operate dynamically, (e.g., depending on their initial criterion values and current criterion 
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values) dynamic systems approach to decision-making was created.  Aspects of these 
systems have been used in research on judgment and decision-making in a number of 
different ways including the Decision Field Theory model (Busemeyer & Townsend, 
1993), explanations of capital investment (Rapoport, 1975), and models of managerial 
behavior (Sternman, 1989).  
The important aspects that make a particular system “dynamic,” as laid out by 
Busemeyer (2001), are as follows: 
1. Actions occur in a series over time in order to achieve a goal; 
2. Said actions are “interdependent,” e.g., later actions depend on previous 
actions; 
3. And the system environment must change spontaneously, as a consequence of 
earlier actions, or both. 
 
Busemeyer (2001) and later Gonzalez (2005) point out several characteristics 
found in dynamic systems tasks that are particularly useful when studying decision-
making.  ‘Dynamic systems’ models offer advantages in testing for differences related to 
the fundamental complexities discussed earlier.  Dynamic systems modeling address goal 
dependencies due to the existence of a goal-oriented time series, allowing for time-
dependent stimuli in the short term and the long term to be introduced and analyzed.  In 
addition, the dynamic systems methodology includes a contextual environment with 
specific implicit (e.g., avoiding zero) and explicit (e.g., making money) aspirations.  
However, by necessity, these dynamic decision making tasks are generally 
oversimplifications of real-world situations and as a result require some additional real-
world knowledge of the decision environment.  In addition, the exact stimulus presented 
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to each participant is not under the complete control of the experimenter, due to the 
interaction of previous information with current information.  As a result, making 
comparisons by averaging across individual decisions or participants no longer suffices 
as an analytical tool.  Therefore, dynamic decision making tasks have to be carefully 
planned and executed, and different analytical tools are required. 
There have been previous forays into extending dynamic systems into decision-
making.  Dynamic systems models are often used with respect to complex multi-attribute 
decision-making (e.g., Decision Field Theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993)).  
Dynamic decision-making has also been used to model decision behavior with respect to 
task rules. This is accomplished by using implicit task-specific goals/aspirations along 
with explicit task instructions.  An example is a firefighting task given by Brehmer 
(1992) and later adapted by Omodei and Wearing (1995). In this task, participants were 
given a hypothetical situation of managing resources to fight a fire.  Participants were put 
through a computer simulation that included things like feedback delays and implicit goal 
contingencies (e.g., don’t let the firehouse burn down).  These dynamic systems models 
often use this type of “micro-world,” which is broadly defined as a complex computer 
task which, though relatively simple, allows researchers to evaluate and control a larger 
set of decision-making characteristics essential in real world dynamic decision-making 
environments. 
‘Dynamic systems modeling’ often relies on mathematical simulation as a type of 
analysis.  First, simulations allow for easy and controlled addition of dynamic system 
variables.  For example, in a simulation, the addition or removal of certain decision 
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strategy constraints (compensatory or noncompensatory) from the micro-world can 
emphasize the impact of different decision criteria under different circumstances.  
Second, simulations can extract the distributional characteristics of combining participant 
experiences with given strategy criteria (and criteria interactions) by isolating those 
specific criteria.  Third, simulations remove the individual differences and individual 
error normally found between participants by determining the actions taken by each 
“participant” a priori.  As a result, a simulation provides a distribution of possible 
outcomes and the relative likelihood for what might occur if participants were to operate 
using only a particular decision criterion or set of criteria within a specified environment. 
While many previous investigations of risk preferences have taken into account 
vantage point criteria, relatively few have attempted to account for the more complex 
elements of goal dependency and aspirations.  Of those previous investigations which 
included complex elements, none have included a thorough analysis of the statistical 
properties associated with time-dependent decision criteria, nor have there been 
systematic attempts to determine whether these more complex decision criteria are 
evident in the decision making of study participants.  This investigation entails two 
methodologies: a series of decision strategy simulations to compare and contrast the 
distributional and statistical aspects of vantage point dependency, goal dependency, and 
aspiration levels; and an empirical manipulation to compare what we learn using 
simulations to actual human decision-making behavior in a dynamic decision-making 
environment.  This study will then attempt to provide a richer understanding of the 
implications associated with vantage point dependency, goal dependency and aspirations 
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by comparing the effectiveness of each level of complexity under simulated ‘optimal’ 
conditions, as well as the effectiveness of each at prediction of how real people make 
decisions. 
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Study One:  Investigate Decision Strategy Simulations 
The purpose of using simulations in this investigation was to address the 
differences in outcomes between a variety of decision strategies that depend to a greater 
or lesser extent on vantage point dependency, goal dependency, and aspiration levels.  In 
previous work, Schneider and colleagues (2006) developed a series of simulations to 
compare the longer-term implications of several different models of decision-making.  
This previous work will be described, followed by an explanation of the extensions to the 
simulation methodology which is currently utilized, followed by an evaluation of the 
results from the current simulation. 
Pilot Simulations 
Our approach in this project is to apply Monte Carlo simulation methodology 
addressed as an analysis tool by dynamic systems modeling to investigate the relationship 
between different kinds of decision-making models (risk policies, valence-dependent, and 
aspirations-based).   In order to lay the groundwork for the investigation into decision-
making in a dynamic decision making environment, mathematical simulations were 
performed for the purposes of this experiment in three phases.  The first phase was to 
simply capture the baseline distributional information about risk preferences.  The second 
phase was to compare and evaluate the distributional aspects of several decision 
strategies that embody the models of late.  The third phase was to compare and evaluate 
the distributional aspects of decision strategies that use contextual information to form an 
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aspiration criterion in determining choice.  For this mathematical simulation, “virtual 
participants” were created to use a specific decision strategy that resembled either 
baseline conditions, decision-making models that only use local intra-lottery 
characteristics as criteria for determining risk preference (Prospect Theory: Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Risk as threat and opportunity: Highhouse & Yuce, 1996, Lopes, 1987, 
Schneider & Lopes, 1986; Risk as variance: Savage, 1954) or aspiration level models 
which use extra-lottery contextual information as criteria for determining risk preference; 
that is, criteria which used the “cumulative total” value (the concatenation of their 
starting value and their outcomes so far) as a means for deciding when to be risky or safe.  
In order to look at vantage point dependency and larger contextual effects, several sets of 
virtual participants were created to make decisions across a series of 36 lotteries.  Each 
set of virtual participants was ascribed with a particular strategy that fit one of three 
major groups. 
Decision Policies 
The Decision Policy strategies include the most basic strategies that represent a 
constant policy that operate independent of lottery characteristics or environmental 
constraints.  These strategies differ exclusively with respect to the presumed shape of 
their utility curve.  The risk-averse strategy can be said to have a concave utility function, 
similar to the utility curve supported by Bernoulli (1738/1954), and always leads to 
selecting the less risky option.  The risk-seeking strategy presumes a convex utility 
function, and opposite to the risk-averse strategy, always leads to the selection of riskier 
options.  The random strategy can be said to imply a straight utility relationship between 
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objective and subjective value, which produces indifference in the choice between 
options of equal expected value.  As a result, option selection is randomly determined.   
Lottery-based Strategies 
The lottery-based strategies are dependent on static characteristics of the lottery 
options for strategy selection.  This set emulates the risk preference patterns of several 
popular models of decision-making.  The first strategy presented represents the Prospect 
Theory Model (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).  In this strategy, lotteries that have 
positive outcomes are evaluated as gains and therefore are met with risk aversion and 
lotteries that have negative outcomes are evaluated as losses and therefore are met with 
risk-seeking behavior, similar to the predictions of the Prospect Theory S-shaped 
subjective value function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  When the choice is between 
mixed lotteries (containing both positive and negative outcomes), they are met with risk 
aversion, based on the loss aversion phenomenon suggested by the Prospect Theory 
model. 
The next strategy is meant to represent the Security/Potential component of the 
SP/A model (Lopes, 1987; Schneider & Lopes, 1986), or is otherwise often described as 
Cautious Optimism or “Risk as threat and opportunity” (Highhouse & Yűce, 1996).  In 
this strategy, lotteries that have all negative outcomes lead to risk being interpreted as a 
threat and therefore the safer option is chosen, while lotteries that have all positive 
outcomes lead to risk being interpreted as an opportunity and therefore the riskier option 
is chosen.  When lotteries have mixed outcomes, they are met with loss aversion, due to 
the typical tendency to prioritize security over potential, or threat over opportunity. 
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The next strategy is meant to represent the Risk as variance or modest risk 
tolerance model, which is similar to a model presented by Savage (1954).  This model 
favors modest amounts of risk on low variance gambles and differentiates lotteries with 
riskless or “sure thing” options by selecting the riskier option, while in all other cases, the 
riskier option is rejected.  This model still involves a reference point that incorporates 
both distance from zero and direction. However, instead of direction from zero in terms 
of objective values, the risk as variance model adjusts risk preference relative to the 
amount of variability (size differences) between outcomes. 
Contextual or Aspiration-based Strategies 
The aspiration-based set of strategies combines contextual information and goals 
as criteria for decision strategies.  Specifically, they define goal-direction as a decision 
criterion, namely the cumulative value across the series of simulation outcomes is the 
focus for changing risk preference.  This incorporates the Aspiration component of the 
SP/A model with the dispositional tendencies.  Specifically, when a virtual participant is 
above a certain desired wealth threshold or ‘aspiration level,’ they focus on potential and 
are willing to take risks, while when a virtual participant is below a certain wealth 
threshold, they focus on security and are not willing to take risks.  Security-focused 
individuals will set their aspiration levels higher so that they only take a risk when they 
are substantially well off.  Potential-focused individuals will set their aspiration level 
lower in order to take advantage of the opportunities possible with the riskier options. 
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Procedure 
These 3 sets of strategies were evaluated using Monte Carlo style simulations.  36 
lottery pairs were presented in one of four different counterbalanced orders.  10,000 
virtual participants were used for each order, for a total of 40,000 per strategy.  These 
virtual participants were assigned to pick the more risky or less risky option based on 
their given strategy.  The results of the simulations were evaluated by examining 
characteristics for each strategy comparing final outcome distributions, central tendency, 
variability, and skew within the final outcome distributions, as well as showing the 
percentage of participants that are consolidated into either the high (denoted “richer”) and 
low (denoted “poorer”) extremes of the final outcome distribution.  The expected value 
for the series of 36 lotteries was $1000 in all cases, and hence all distributions had the 
same mean.   
Preliminary Results of the Initial Investigation 
For the Risk Policy strategies, we tested the baseline conditions for always 
choosing the more risky of two options (denoted “Risk-seeking”), always choosing the 
less risky of two options (denoted “Risk-averse”), and a condition in which risk 
preference was determined completely randomly (denoted “Random”).  
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Figure 3: The final outcome distributions for the baseline strategies.  “SimLo” designates an entirely 
risk-averse strategy, “SimHi” designates an entirely risk-seeking strategy, and “Random” designates 
an entirely random strategy. 
As shown in Figure 3, we found that decision strategies involving only risk-
seeking choices have a final outcome distribution with a large amount of variance, 
meaning there are fewer participants at or around the mean and more participants who 
ended up at the extremes (e.g., very “rich” or ended up very “poor”).  Conversely, a 
decision strategy that involves only risk-averse moves has a final outcome distribution 
with a small amount of variance, meaning there are more participants at or around the 
mean and fewer participants at the extremes.  Also, a decision strategy that involves only 
random choices has a final outcome distribution that is intermediate to the risk-averse and 
risk-seeking strategy. 
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For the lottery-based strategies, we tested the strategies based on the Prospect 
theory model (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), the Risk as Threat and Opportunity or 
Security/Potential component of the SP/A model (Lopes, 1987; Schneider & Lopes, 
1986), and the Risk as variance model (Savage, 1954).  We found that decision strategies 
that are based on these models of decision-making which happen to only use local, static 
characteristics of individual lotteries (shown in Figure 4) are similar to Risk Policy 
strategies in that they differ systematically in distributional variability.   
 
Figure 4: The final outcome distributions for the strategies based on models of decision-making.  
Risk policies from the previous Figure are included. 
 
These local, lottery-based strategies were symmetrical just like the baseline 
strategies, but differed in the amount of variance.  The amount of variance in a particular 
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final outcome distribution was completely determined by the number of risky moves that 
a particular strategy makes for a given series of lotteries.  The more risky choices that a 
strategy demands throughout the series of lotteries, the higher the variance or the more 
the final outcome distribution looks like the “always risk-seeking” strategy.  The more 
risk-averse actions, the lower the variance or the more the final outcome distribution 
looks like the “always risk-averse” strategy. 
The percentages of participants in the extremes for the final outcome distribution 
are shown in Figure 5.  This illustrates the difference that strategies make in determining 
the likelihood of ending up at the extremes.  The likelihood of ending up in the extremes 
is very low for strategies that include more risk-averse choices, while the likelihood of 
ending up in the extremes increases as a number of riskier choices increases.  In addition, 
there is relative symmetry found in both lottery-based and baseline strategy conditions.  
For the most part, there is the same percentage of participants in the higher outcome 
groups as the lower outcome groups. 
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Figure 5: The percentage of the virtual participants for a given strategy found in the extremes of the 
final outcome distribution.  The names of the strategies follow the same naming conventions 
discussed earlier.  
 
From comparing these strategies, we found that there were systematic differences 
in strategies based on linear models, and those differences were limited to the amount of 
variance in the final outcome distribution.  The means of these final outcome 
distributions were all identical, as was the likelihood of ending up in a good place as a 
bad place within a given strategy.  Some of the strategies shared a near identical amount 
variance, namely the Prospect Theory model, the Risk as Threat model, and the Random 
baseline condition.  However, the similarities between the Risk as Threat model, the 
Prospect Theory model, and the Random baseline condition existed because the stimulus 
set had approximately the same number of negative lotteries as positive lotteries.  If there 
were more negative lotteries than positive lotteries, then the Risk as Threat model would 
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have exhibited more risk-averse behavior and would hence have had a distribution that 
looked more like the risk-averse strategy’s final outcome distribution, while the Prospect 
theory model would have exhibited more risk-seeking behavior and would hence have a 
distribution that looked more like the risk-seeking strategy. 
 For the aspiration-based set, we tested strategies that used an aspiration 
criterion in determining choice by comparing the current wealth with a specific 
aspiration. Unlike other strategies, we demonstrated that decision strategies using this, 
noncompensatory, longer-term aspiration based strategy (shown in Figure 6) created 
skew in the final outcome distribution, increasing the likelihood of ending up in one tail 
of the distribution while simultaneously decreasing the likelihood of ending up in the 
other tail of the distribution.   
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Figure 6: The final outcome distributions for the strategies based on aspiration level criteria.  The 
names of the strategies follow the same naming conventions discussed earlier. 
 
Specifically, for the single aspiration level strategies (denoted ‘Cumulative total: 
800’ and ‘Cumulative total: 1200’), when a virtual participant has less than the specific 
aspiration level (800 or 1200 respectively) as their current total, the decision strategy 
dictated to act risk-averse until the specific aspiration level was reached, then for as long 
as that specific aspiration level was exceeded, the strategy dictated to act risk seeking.  
This causes final distributions to look like the risk-averse strategy distribution on the left 
side but like the risk-seeking strategy on the right side.  Final outcome distributions for 
these strategies are skewed to the right, such that there were fewer people who ended up 
very poor and more people who ended up very wealthy.  Of course, the positive skew 
also offsets the median and the mode to the left, meaning that these strategies also 
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increase the likelihood that you will end up slightly below average.  In other words, for a 
small increase in the likelihood of being slightly less than average, one can substantially 
decrease chances of being extremely poor and increase chances of being extremely rich.  
The dual criterion strategy operated such that as long as a virtual participant was between 
the two specific aspiration values (400 and 1600), the decision strategy dictated risk 
aversion, and if those values were exceeded, the decision strategy dictated risk seeking.   
The comparison of these groups can be seen in Figure 7, which depicts the 
percentage of virtual participants who ended up at the tails of the final outcome 
distribution.   
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Figure 7: The percentage of the virtual participants for a given strategy found in the extremes of the 
final outcome distribution.  The names of the strategies follow the same naming conventions 
discussed earlier. 
From comparing these strategies, we learn that asymmetries can be created in a 
final outcome distribution if a long-term aspiration level is used as a criterion in the 
decision strategy. Of the strategies tested, only those that rely on aspirations can 
differentially manipulate the long run probabilities of ending up rich or poor. 
From the pilot work, we learned that the final outcome distributions for Risk 
Policy and Lottery-based strategies that use static criteria can only be symmetrical, such 
that users of those strategies were equally likely over time to end up very rich or very 
poor, though their risk preferences provided some control over the combined likelihood 
of landing in the extremes.  However, given the use of the long-term aspirations as a 
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decision criterion, there is the capacity to create an asymmetry in the final outcome 
distribution.  Decision strategies that use decision policies or local, lottery-based criteria 
as the determining factors for risky choice are limited in their ability to change the 
likelihood of ending up in a good place over a bad place.  However, decision strategies 
that use contextual or aspiration-based criteria have the benefit of differentially 
controlling the likelihood of ending up in a relatively good place over a relatively bad 
place.  This pilot work lends itself to the importance of time-dependent criteria, as well as 
the dynamic systems modeling, which is used to test for time-dependent criteria. 
Figuring out precisely how and why an aspiration level decision strategy works is 
important because finding a point at which there is the “most” skew or the “most” long 
run benefit may help us figure out when and how actual people might use these strategies.  
In addition, we expect trajectory-based decision strategies to make an impact in the long 
run beyond simple lottery-based strategies because trajectory based decision strategies 
satisfy the conditions of dynamic criteria: They are time-dependent and preferences 
change dynamically. 
Current Simulation Study One Methods 
For the current project, the previously outlined simulation methodology has been 
revamped in a number of ways so as to further investigate the influence of time-
dependent criteria that take into account the contextual, historical, and goal-related 
information of the decision maker.  These changes are as follows: 
 (1)  Aspiration levels were more thoroughly manipulated, so as to identify the 
“optimal” levels of skew for a given simulation environment.  In addition, aspiration 
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levels that occur between two possible current total values were used to reduce 
distributional “lumps” that are artifacts of our stimuli.   
(2)  A new phase of strategies that use outcome trajectories as their basis were 
created and compared.  These strategies allow us to evaluate how the dynamic reference 
points mentioned earlier operate in our simulation.  These strategies use information 
about the previous outcomes to determine their current choice, similar to goal 
dependency.  These outcome trajectory strategies come in two forms. 
The first form looks at the previous seven lotteries and makes a distinction with 
respect to risk preference depending on the number of the outcomes that are good vs. 
bad.1    For example, if of the previous seven lotteries, four are the “worse” outcome and 
three are the “better” outcome, a trajectory strategy would make a choice based on the 
fact that there is a ‘majority’ of worse outcomes.  This strategy operates without using 
distance from zero or direction from zero in determining risk preference, and is important 
because it gives a crude measure for individual effect of outcome trajectory on the final 
outcome distribution separate from the other influences of reference points. 
The outcome trajectory strategies are named based on the virtual participant’s 
inferred interpretation of the future directions for the trajectory.  The virtual participants 
who are using the Continuation strategy are inferring from their trajectory that if they are 
currently doing “well” (the trajectory has more “wins” than “losses) that they will 
continue to do well and they attempt to take full advantage by exhibiting risk seeking 
                                                 
1 Because our simulation uses two-outcome lotteries, one outcome is usually better than the other.  Hence 
“better” outcomes are ‘good’ relatively speaking insofar as they are better than “worse” outcomes, even 
though in the absolute sense they may be positive, negative, or zero. 
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behavior, while if they are currently doing “poorly” (the trajectory has more “losses”) 
they infer that they will continue to do poorly and they attempt to diminish potential 
future losses by exhibiting risk aversion. 
The Discontinuation strategy exhibits the opposite inference from the trajectory 
information.  For example, if a virtual participant using the Discontinuation strategy is 
currently doing “well,” they infer that they will not continue to do well and they attempt 
to diminish potential future losses by exhibiting risk aversion, while if the same virtual 
participant is currently doing “poorly,” they infer that they will not continue to do poorly 
and they hence attempt to take advantage of the future gains by exhibiting risk seeking 
behavior. 
The second form of goal-dependent strategies make a distinction with respect to 
risk preference depending on whether a participant has won or lost money over the 
previous seven lotteries.  Specifically, since each lottery has a specific outcome, the 
outcomes for the previous seven lotteries are summed, and then risk preference is 
determined by whether that sum is positive or negative.  This is important because it 
includes the additional reference point information that is left out of the previous 
incarnation of goal trajectories, so as to allow a direct comparison of the interaction 
between static and dynamic reference point information. 
Using the new decision environments, additional final-outcome likelihood 
distributions, measures were created and compared for central tendency, variability, and 
skew, and the percentage of participants that dropped out or “died,” or ended up in the 
high and low extremes of the final outcome distribution. 
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Materials/Stimuli 
 Each virtual participant ‘saw’ a set of 36 monetary two-outcome lotteries.  
Each virtual participant began the experiment with 200, 1000, or 1800, and the final 
adjusted expected value for the series of lotteries is 1000.  Outcomes of the lotteries 
accumulate as the virtual participant continues through the study.  The lotteries can be 
positive or negative, and each will have an expected value that ranges from +400 to -400. 
Design 
This study involves testing strategies using a series of two-outcome lotteries in a 
Monte-Carlo-style simulation.  Each virtual participant is created to follow an assigned 
algorithm derived from the strategies in Table 1.  The measures of interest are the 
outcomes that virtual participants received based on each trial, the cumulated earnings 
from trial to trial, and the distribution of final outcomes across a given strategy.  In 
addition, to reduce order effects, four lottery orders were used across all strategies. 
Strategies.  All the strategies addressed in the preliminary investigation were 
redone.  In addition, the strategies regarding outcome trajectories described in Table 1 
were performed and compared. 
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Table 1: List of Strategy Types used in Pilot Simulations. 
Strategy Explanation 
Risk-averse Virtual participants exhibit risk-averse behavior across all 
lotteries by choosing the less risky option, which reduces 
variance. 
Risk-seeking Virtual participants exhibit risk-seeking behavior across all 
lotteries by choosing the more risky option, which increases 
variance. 
Non-systematic, or 
“Random” 
Virtual participants used a non-systematic method to determine 
risk preference. Randomly chose between riskier and less risky 
options. 
Modest Variance Virtual participants are willing to accept some but not all of risk.  
When faced with lotteries that start with a high initial variance, 
they choose the less risky option, and when faced with lotteries 
that start with a low or moderate initial variance, they choose the 
riskier option. 
Prospect Theory Virtual participants act in accord with the S-shaped value 
function described in Prospect Theory.  When facing a ‘loss’ 
lottery, participants chose the riskier option. When facing a ‘gain’ 
lottery, participants choose the less risky option.  When facing a 
lottery with mixed outcomes, participants exhibit loss aversion 
and thus choose the less risky option.   
Risk As Threat Virtual participants avoid risks when they are a threat, and only 
exhibit risk-averse behavior when faced with a potential loss. 
When facing a ‘gain’ lottery, participants choose the riskier 
option. When facing a ‘loss’ lottery, participants choose the less 
risky option.  When facing a lottery with mixed outcomes, 
participants exhibit loss aversion and thus choose the less risky 
option.   
Cumulative Total: 
Aspiration 
Virtual participants act based on the amount of money they have 
accumulated so far.  If the virtual participant's cumulative total is 
below the aspiration value, they choose the less risky option, 
whereas if the virtual participant's cumulative total is above the 
value, they choose the riskier option.  Proposed aspiration values: 
775, 975, 1025, 1225.  In addition, we will include one 
asymmetric dual aspiration, where if a participant has less than 
375, they exhibit risk seeking.  The reverse, in which a 
participant’s cumulative total being below a given aspiration 
value elicits risk seeking behavior and a participant’s cumulative 
total being above a given aspiration level elicits risk aversion, 
will also be evaluated at all of the proposed aspiration values. 
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Strategy Explanation 
Goal Trajectories, 
Number of 
Outcomes 
Based on the number of better or worse outcomes for the 
previous seven lotteries, if there are more of the better than worse 
outcomes received, one of the risk policies is exhibited, while if 
there are more of the worse than better outcomes received, the 
other risk policy is exhibited.  “Sure thing” outcomes, in which 
both outcomes of a given lottery are the same, were randomly 
attributed as either better or worse.  Continuation infers that if 
things are going well (a majority of better outcomes), they will 
continue to go well and so risk-seeking should be employed, 
while Discontinuation infers that if things are going well, they 
will not continue to go well, and so risk-aversion should be 
employed. 
Goal Trajectories, 
Cumulative Values 
of Outcomes 
If the overall change in current total for the previous seven 
lotteries is positive, the higher option is improved simulating 
risk-seeking behavior while if it is negative, the lower option is 
improved, simulating risk-averse behavior.  If equal to zero, the 
participant exhibits risk aversion. 
Note. Strategies were named based on their similarity to current theories and ideas in human decision 
making literature.  Prospect theory was developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
 
Orders. Two randomized orders of 36 two-outcome lotteries were created.  Then 
these two orders were reversed (the first lottery in the initial order became the last lottery 
in the new order, the second lottery in the initial order became the second to last in the 
new order, etc.) to create two completely new orders, making a total of 4 orders.   
Measurements. Using Excel, two databases were created for each simulation 
strategy: The first database logs the outcome value of each virtual participant at each 
lottery and the second database shows the accumulation of outcome values across the 
lotteries completed thus far. 
Participants 
Forty thousand virtual participants were created to simulate each strategy 
condition.  Ten thousand participants were run through each of the 4 orders for each of 
the 12 strategies for a total of 480,000 virtual participants. 
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Procedure 
The procedure applied to the current simulation methodology is the same as the 
procedure used in the pilot simulation discussed earlier. 
Study One Analysis of Simulations 
 The simulations were analyzed by comparing the outcome distributions 
after 36 trials, including: measures of central tendency, variability, and skew; the 
percentage of participants that end up in the high and low extremes of the final outcome 
distribution; and, where applicable, the percentage of participants who “went broke.”  
First, additional findings pertaining to aspiration level strategies are addressed.  Then, 
any novelty that can be attributed to the outcome trajectory strategies is addressed, 
followed by a step-by-step explanation of how specific changes to the decision 
environment affect different types of strategies (risk policy, static lottery-based, 
aspiration level-based, and trajectory-based).     
The Aspiration level Criterion: A Thorough Investigation 
While investigating aspiration-based or ‘cumulative total’ strategies, we looked to 
answer two distinctly different questions with the current simulations:  (1) Why does 
skew occur when using a cumulative total strategy? and (2) How can we ‘set’ and 
aspiration level so as to achieve the maximal level of skew? 
The answer to question one may be most easily answered by recognizing that the 
cumulative total functions over time as the current measure of success.  In this sense, the 
cumulative total can be seen as a running tally of a virtual participant’s progress thus far 
in the task.  As a result, making decisions based on cumulative wealth allows participants 
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to manipulate variability differently based on where they consider themselves doing 
comparatively good or bad with respect to the “average” or expectation.  However, 
participants do not necessarily have to use what they expect as their aspiration level, they 
may just as well use some external constraint (e.g., “my rent is $500, so regardless of 
what I expect, I need at least that much.”) 
 
Figure 8: Theoretical Example of how distributional variability is manipulated with respect to 
current progress. 
 
For instance, if thus-far in the task, your “current total” is comparatively quite 
low, you might consider that because you want the highest opportunity of getting at least 
the mean, you would decide to taking fewer risks, or exhibiting the risk-aversion strategy 
(represented by the blue line in figure 8).  When doing comparatively well with a high 
current total, you might try to take advantage of the potential to achieve a very high 
amount by taking more risks, or exhibiting the risk seeking strategy (shown in red).  
Hence, a sort of “skew” is created as a result of manipulating distributional variability 
depending on the rough estimate of current position on the final outcome distribution.   
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Figure 9: Rendering of the “optimal” skewed distribution.  Variability is minimized when you 
consider yourself to have less than average and maximized when you consider yourself as having 
more than average based on the goals asserted by Schneider and colleagues (2007) to be the focus of 
real world decision making. 
 
Schneider and colleagues (2007) suggests that if people knew they were going to 
do worse than the average, they would form a goal that attempts to increase the likelihood 
of getting as close to the average as possible.  In addition, if people knew they were going 
to do better than the average, Schneider asserts that they would form a goal that attempts 
to maximize the potential to get as far away from the average as possible.  As a result, a 
pattern emerges such that one minimizes risk when one would interpret themselves as 
doing worse than the average (risk aversion) and maximizes risk when one would 
interpret themselves as doing better than the average (risk seeking).  Because the risk 
averse and risk seeking strategies each represent a particular risk manipulation technique 
(always safe choices or always risky choices respectively) within the constraints of the 
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decision environment2, combining half of each together across the mean should create a 
representation of the optimal skewed distribution that would satisfy both of these goals. 
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Figure 10: Comparison of different aspiration level strategy final outcome distributions with the 
optimal skewed distribution under pilot (36 trials) conditions. The aspiration level strategies are 
named after the cutoff point used to switch from risk aversion (when current total is less than the 
given value) to risk seeking (when current total is more than the given value). 
 
As shown in Figure 10, the aspiration level strategies are found to look similar to 
the optimal distribution (also shown).    In addition, if one uses the mean or overall 
expected value of the lottery series (in our simulations, 1000) as one’s aspiration level, a 
distribution of final outcomes is formed that is comparatively the most similar to the 
                                                 
2 Total lottery distributional variability is determined by a multitude of factors, such as the range of 
expected values for individual lotteries, the range of differences in the size of ticket values, the total 
number of lotteries, etc. 
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optimal skewed distribution.  This does not suggest that using the expected value as the 
aspiration level is necessarily optimal in its own right, since individual preference may 
still dictate overall tendencies toward risk, in additional to external goals playing an 
integral role in aspiration formation. 
For instance, even though using the expected value as the aspiration level “cutoff” 
creates the most skew for the distribution, an individual might set their aspiration level 
“cutoff” as a small margin more than what’s expected so as to still tend towards risk 
aversion, since the larger the aspiration level is compared to the expected value, the more 
the distribution of outcomes tends toward the risk averse strategy.  As an aspiration level 
becomes unattainably large, a participant would always have a current total that is less 
than their aspiration level, and hence the final outcome distribution would become the 
risk aversion final outcome distribution, whereas if the aspiration level is set as always 
attained (or otherwise unreasonably low), the distribution of final outcomes becomes the 
risk seeking strategy distribution. 
As a result, having information about “what is expected” in the decision 
environment is helpful in achieving the most effective use of the aspiration level strategy.  
Without a reasonable expectation, an aspiration level may end up having been set too 
high, which would result in a predominance of risk averse behavior, or too low, which 
would result in a predominance of risk seeking behavior.  If your goals coincide with 
those posited by Schneider and colleagues (2007), then you should use an aspiration level 
as we have described it, as it will create distributional asymmetry in a manner that is 
consistent with those goals. 
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New Phase of Strategies: Outcome and Cumulative Trajectories 
Even though aspiration levels can generate asymmetry and achieve an outcome 
distribution that looks similar to the optimal skewed distribution, they are limited in their 
scope when it comes to the real world.  A fixed aspiration level cannot account for 
changes in the overall direction of experiences.  For example, if one sets an aspiration 
level, and then one’s environment systematically fluctuates between doing well for a 
while (better than average), then doing poorly for a while (worse than average), then 
doing well for a while again, one’s aspiration level strategy would only suggest risks be 
taken with respect to how much one has, not to the fluctuations in the environment.  
While this is still perfectly reasonable, it is not necessarily optimal, as the main goal is to 
take risks when one’s situation is evaluated as better than average, and there is obviously 
something systematic going on in a time-dependent manner not accounted for by 
aspiration levels.  The problem is that aspiration levels are “fixed”; they aren’t sensitive 
to changes in environmental trajectory, only changes in cumulative outcomes. 
In part to account for the fixed nature of aspiration levels, outcome trajectory 
strategies, which do not have a fixed value for risk preference distinctions, and 
cumulative trajectory strategies, which focus on changes to the cumulative total instead 
of the actual value, were investigated.  A trajectory focuses on directly experienced 
information from the recent past to make choices about the immediate future (Schneider 
& Barnes, 2003).  This differs from aspiration level strategies because in most cases there 
is no fixed cumulative value being used by the participants; only recent salient 
information about the direct past few events.  The criterion for action with respect to risk 
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in an outcome trajectory relies only on outcomes evaluated as “good”, “bad”, “better,” or 
“worse” over a particular interval.  As a result, information about all of the previous 
performance is not necessarily required.   
Refer to p. 26 and 27 to see the specifics of how outcome trajectory strategies and 
cumulative trajectories work.  
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Figure 11: Comparison of different outcome and cumulative trajectory final outcome distributions 
with the “optimal” skewed distribution under pilot conditions.  The number of previous trials used is 
seven unless otherwise stated.  
 
As can be seen in figure 11, using an outcome trajectory strategy or a cumulative 
trajectory strategy can generate skew in the final outcome distribution such that one is 
more likely to end up at one end of the final outcome distribution over the other.  The 
shape of these trajectory strategies is mesokurtic (similar shape as a normal distribution) 
while the shape of the aspiration levels is leptokurtic (higher probability of ending up at 
the mean and at extreme values compared to the normal distribution). 
 43 
Why there is Skew and the Insensitivity to Expected Value.  Trajectory decision 
strategy outcome distributions are skewed because, by evaluating a subset of previous 
outcomes as “better” than average or “worse” than average and then looking for a 
majority, one is provided a rough estimate of progress thus far in the task, much like the 
current total provides a rough estimate of progress as it is used with the aspiration level 
criterion. 
Outcome trajectory strategies do not require that you be able to add up all the 
previous outcomes into a statistic that represent all the previous outcome information 
(current total), unlike aspiration level decision strategies.  As previously stated, the final 
outcome distributions for aspiration level decision strategies become more or less skewed 
as the aspiration level cutoff point becomes closer or further away from the overall 
expected value of the lottery series (1000).  These trajectory strategies do not use the 
actual current total as the determinant for risk preference, but rather changes or perceived 
changes in performance as the determinant for risk preference, so the expected value does 
not need to be known to effectively use a goal-trajectory based decision strategy. 
The Direction of Skew for a Trajectory Strategy. The direction of skew (left or 
right) depends on the behavior exhibited by the decision maker when a majority of 
better/worse outcomes is acquired.  When a majority of better outcomes is experienced 
and risk seeking is exhibited, skew follows the same direction as the aspiration level 
criterion.  However, when risk aversion is exhibited during a majority of better outcomes 
being experienced, skew goes in the opposite direction.  In addition, cumulative 
trajectories can be seen here as less skewed than outcome trajectories. 
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The skew changes direction between the two outcome trajectory strategies 
because behavior with respect to “how well you are doing so far” is different between the 
two strategies.  For example, if when using the Continuation strategy, a decision maker 
experienced a majority of “better” outcomes, the strategy suggests that since the decision 
maker would consider themselves as doing well and therefore suggest risk-seeking 
behavior, which follows similarly to the goals laid out by Schneider and colleagues 
(2007); the skew for the Continuation strategy follows in the same direction as the 
aspiration level strategies, since risks are being taken at similar times relative to one’s 
evaluation of current progress (e.g., “when I evaluate my progress as above average, I am 
risk seeking”).  However, if you were using the Discontinuation strategy and you 
experienced a majority of “better” outcomes, you would then exhibit risk aversion, and 
hence skew goes in the opposite direction. 
Why Cumulative Trajectories differ from Outcome Trajectories.  For cumulative 
trajectory strategies, a similar evaluation of situated progress in the task is taking place, 
however the element being evaluated (change to cumulative total) is heavily influenced 
by the fluctuation in the values of the individual lotteries.  For instance, if one of the five 
previous lotteries had an extremely low expected value (for example, if the previous five 
outcomes were -50, -450,150, 50, 0) or if the expected values for the previous five 
lotteries were all of a similar direction from zero (for example, if the previous five 
outcomes were 100, 50, 150, 0, 50), then the changes in cumulative total are not 
necessarily representative of changes in relative success in the task.  Skew seems to only 
present itself when a decision strategy uses an accurate measure of performance, not 
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simply overall changes in cumulative value due to changes in the static task environment.  
Cumulative trajectory strategies are problematic because they are overly sensitive to 
order effects and extreme expected values in certain specific instances like the above 
mentioned examples.  However, that is not to say there won’t be instances where 
cumulative trajectory accurately gauges relative progress in the task, and hence skew is 
still present, however it is reduced compared to outcome trajectories. 
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
-4
00
-2
00 0 20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00
12
00
14
00
16
00
18
00
20
00
22
00
24
00
Optimal Distribution
Outcome: 5 Previous Trials, Cont.
Outcome: 7 Previous Trials, Cont.
Outcome: All Previous Trials, Cont.
 
Figure 12: Outcome Trajectories using different number of previous outcomes as determinants for 
risk preference. 
 
The number of Previous Outcomes being Evaluated.  Figure 12 compares 
different versions of the Continuation outcome trajectory strategy.  Each version of the 
Continuation strategy uses a different-sized subset of previous outcomes from which it 
attempts to determine a majority.  For the strategy labeled “5 previous trials,” the 
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decision strategy only evaluated the five trials that immediately preceded the current trial 
to search for a majority (so in this case, if there were 3 or more of the “better” outcomes).  
“7 previous trials” only used the immediately-preceding 7 trials, and all previous trials 
used all the previous trials.  As can be seen in figure 12, the skew in the final outcome 
distribution is greater for the decision strategies that use more of the previous outcome 
information.  For example, if instead of only looking at the majority of the previous seven 
outcomes, I were looking at the majority of the previous nine outcomes, the final 
outcome distribution would be further skewed.  If one were to use fewer of the previous 
outcomes to establish a majority of “better” over “worse” outcomes, one would see a 
reduction in the amount of distributional skew. 
In addition, by looking at all the previous outcomes (shown in figure 12 above), 
the distribution becomes maximally skewed, because all the previous outcomes are being 
taken into account.  As with the aspiration level decision strategies, the more accurate the 
information about previous and current performance (e.g., closer approximation to what’s 
expected3), the more effectively a decision maker can choose to be risk-seeking or risk 
averse consistent with their goals about where they end up relative to what they expect 
(e.g., Schneider, 2007). 
                                                 
3 The accuracy of previous information for outcome trajectories is relative to the “expectation” of 
receiving the “better” of the two outcomes equally often as receiving the “worse” of the two 
outcomes. 
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Study One Results Summary 
After further investigation of the aspiration level decision strategies, we 
established an aspiration level’s sensitivity to the expected value of the series of lotteries.  
Aspiration levels require information about “what is expected” at the end of the lottery 
series (overall expected value).  The more accurate the information about “what is 
expected” is to the overall expected value for the lottery series, the more skew can be 
generated in the outcome distribution. 
In addition, we have created decision strategies that use the previous outcomes 
and changes in cumulative total as determinants for risk preference, which are insensitive 
to expected value, but are also sensitive to one’s ability to remember previous events.  
Outcome trajectory strategies, which establish a majority from a subset of previous 
outcomes evaluated as “better” or “worse” compared to the alternative outcome, can 
skew the distribution of outcomes, though less-so compared to aspiration level strategies.  
Cumulative trajectory strategies, which use the changes in cumulative total across a 
subset of previous lotteries, can also skew the distribution of outcomes, though less-so 
compared to outcome trajectory strategies and aspiration level strategies.   
As the subset of previous outcomes being used in a trajectory strategy is made 
larger, the amount of skew that can be generated in the distribution becomes larger as 
well.  Aspiration level decision strategies and trajectory decision strategies are in essence 
using a similar means to impact the outcome distribution; some measure of performance 
relative to “what is expected” is used to switch between risk-seeking and risk-averse 
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behavior when current performance is evaluated as either “better than expected” or 
“worse than expected.” 
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Study Two:  Test for Parameters of the Decision Environment 
It is presumable that by changing the environment in which decisions take place, 
the effectiveness of certain decision strategies may change.  For example, how will 
different decision strategies be affected by increasing the number of lotteries in the series, 
removing certain kinds of lotteries, or introducing a real-world noncompensatory 
component?  In an attempt to address these concerns, we present several variations on the 
previously presented methodology to investigate how the effectiveness of decision 
strategies may change under certain circumstances.  
Study Two Methods 
We suggested three specific adaptations to the decision environment used in the 
previous simulation study to investigate how subtle changes to the decision environment 
might affect the performance of different decision strategy types. 
(1)  72 trials were used instead of 36 in an attempt to eliminate anomalies in the 
final outcome distributions.  Also, the effectiveness of trajectory-based strategies is 
investigated. 
(2)  In an attempt to introduce a non-compensatory real-world component, all of 
the decision strategies were re-tested under the constraints that if a participant fell below 
a certain wealth threshold (went broke), they no longer accumulate any more wealth 
(equivalent to dying). 
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(3)  In order to examine the effects of each strategy in an environment similar to 
the experimental conditions in which Prospect theory model and other models have been 
tested, a version of the decision environment was simulated using decisions that were 
either entirely riskless or very risky. 
Unless otherwise explicitly stated, all materials, orders, valences, series lengths, 
simulations types, and procedures are the same as in Study 1. 
Study Two Analysis of Simulations 
An Examination of Trial Series Length 
When the total length of the trial series was increased from 36 trials to 72 trials, 
there was little change in any of the strategies.  This parameter for decision simulations 
can be thought of similarly to increasing the ‘n’ for a sampling distribution in inferential 
statistics.  By increasing the number of trials each participant goes through and holding 
all else equal, it is a transition from one sampling distribution to another more 
representative sampling distribution.  The more representative sampling distribution 
makes decision strategies more normally distributed.  As a result, risk policies and static 
lottery-based strategies remained relatively unchanged, aside from appearing more 
normally distributed in shape.   
However, should a decision strategy use the number of previous outcomes (as 
with the trajectory strategies) or make some other calculation based on overall 
distributional variability (as with aspiration level strategies), there are likely to be other 
changes in distributional shape. 
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Figure 13: Comparison of 36 trial lottery distributions and 72 trial lottery distributions for 
aspiration level strategies. 
 
The median and mode values for the aspiration level strategy final outcome 
distributions were further skewed roughly $150 more to the right compared to 36 trials.  
Aspiration-based strategies with 72 trials are also much more leptokurtotic, resulting in a 
higher likelihood at the mean and in the extremes.  Even though there were more 
opportunities for virtual participants to reach intermediate final outcomes, the 
distributions for the 72 lottery series do not appear to be much smoother.  Because there 
are more trials with which to vary distributional variability based on cumulative total, the 
skew is likely to increase just as a result of the afforded opportunities.  However, the 
skew that is added based on increasing this parameter is limited.  If trial length was 
extended infinitely (as with a continuous probability distribution), the aspiration level 
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strategies would look like some variant of the optimal final outcome distribution, with 
different amounts of skew depending on their “cutoff” values. 
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Figure 14: Comparison of 36 trial lottery distributions and 72 trial lottery distributions for trajectory 
strategies. 
 
However, goal-dependent/trajectory strategies, shown in Figure 14, lost a 
substantial portion of skew, mainly because the subset of seven previous lotteries which 
were used to evaluate progress now represented a smaller percentage of the total trials, 
and hence were less reflective of total progress in the task.  The functionality of a 
trajectory strategy with limited information about previous outcomes (e.g., limited to only 
the previous seven outcomes) is such that the more previous information you can 
evaluate (your limit) compared to the total amount of previous information (the lotteries 
series length) the more accurate your derived evaluation of your current progress relative 
to the “mean” or average participant. 
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The Implications of “Going Broke” 
The percentage of participants who “went broke” is shown in Figure 15.  The risk 
aversion policy had the fewest number of participants drop out and the risk seeking 
policy had the largest number of participants drop out.  Other static strategies had 
participants drop out relative to their overall riskiness.  Because the random, Prospect 
Theory, and Risk as Threat strategies all have roughly the same amount of final outcome 
distributional variability in this instance,  it only makes sense that roughly the same 
percentage of participants would drop out of the study for those three strategies.  There 
are, however, slight differences between the random, Prospect Theory, and Risk as Threat 
as the result of simple order effects. 
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Figure 15: Percentage of participants who dropped out of the study (via reaching zero) for each static 
strategy (left) and dynamic strategy (right). 
 
However, aspiration level strategies show a strong benefit in this decision 
environment, with a large reduction in the percentage of participants who drop out, as 
shown in figure 15.  It is important to note that the aspiration level criterion as a measure 
of progress is sensitive to the distance of the current total to zero, while outcome 
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trajectory strategies are insensitive to one’s current total.  Hence, outcome trajectory 
strategies showed no benefit over static strategies under these conditions.  Also, 
cumulative trajectory strategies use changes in cumulative total as the criterion, and 
hence cannot take into account information about what the actual cumulative total is, but 
only how it has changed.  As a result, it is understandable that the cumulative trajectory 
strategy shows no improvement compared to other trajectory strategies or static 
strategies.  
Riskless versus Very Risky Lotteries 
The next change in the decision environment involved removing from the choice 
set all the lottery pairs that did not include a “sure thing” option, in addition to doubling 
the difference in the ticket separation values. This was done in an attempt to approximate 
the “riskless” choice options used when for the initial proposition of Prospect Theory 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).   
For example, if the lottery pair included a 50/50 chance between $100 and $200 
or a 50/50 chance between $50 and $250, it was excluded from this manipulation.  
However, if the lottery pair included a 50/50 chance between $100 and $200 or a sure 
thing of $150, all values were doubled, making the new lottery choice between either a 
50/50 chance of $200 and $400 or a sure thing of $300.  Because there were both positive 
and negative lotteries being doubled, the expected value remained the same.   
When the lottery choice set was limited to a choice between lotteries that were 
either riskless or very risky as explained previously, risk policies showed a vast change.  
For the risk averse strategy, all virtual participants ended with a final outcome that was 
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equal to the mean of the distribution (since they always selected the riskless choice) and 
for the risk seeking strategy, virtual participants’ final outcomes were more spread out, 
due to the increase in total variability to the decision environment.  Lottery-based 
strategies based on valence showed relatively no change, while the decision strategy that 
uses the amount of ticket separations (modest variance) became akin to a risk policy, 
since there was only one type of inter-lottery variation. 
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Figure 16: Aspiration level strategies for riskless v. very risky lottery set.  Note that there are only 
40,000 virtual participants per strategy, one-third the participants compared to previous outcome 
distributions. 
 
 Aspiration-based strategies showed an increase in skew, since an increase in 
inter-lottery variability (lotteries were made to be more risky) meant that changes in to 
the cumulative total were more meaningful as a gauge of progress in the task. 
Outcome trajectories, however, are ineffective in the face of riskless outcomes, 
because there is no way to extrapolate meaningful information.  For instance, if I am 
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offering you a choice between two sets of two outcomes with equal probability, the first 
set consists of 5 dollars or 15 dollars while the second set consists of 10 dollars or 10 
dollars, if you choose the second set, there is no meaningful way to differentiate getting 
one of the 10 dollar outcomes as better or worse than the other 10 dollar outcome.  As 
soon as a majority of riskless options has been chosen, the decision strategy has no way 
of distinguishing a majority of better-worse outcomes, unless there is a stochastic method 
(flipping a coin) which would lead one to tend back towards risk seeking behavior. 
Study Two Results Summary 
Under decision environments with different characteristics or conditions, such as 
longer trial lengths, non-compensatory dropping out conditions, and changes in the 
availability of intermediate risk (as in the riskless v. very risky environment), there are 
advantages and disadvantages for each type of decision strategy, but especially for 
dynamic decision strategies like the aspiration level strategies or the goal trajectory 
strategies.  When a lottery series of 72 trials is used instead of 36 trials, static decision 
strategy outcome distributions are found on the whole to appear more normally 
distributed, while aspiration level decision strategy outcome distributions are more 
leptokurtotic. 
When a non-compensatory drop-out component (dropping out of the study) is 
introduced, the advantage of one static strategy over another is directly related to the 
amount of overall final outcome distributional variability (less variability leads to fewer 
virtual participants “going broke”).  However, by skewing the final outcome distribution 
via a dynamic decision strategy, it is possible to capitalize on the advantages of static 
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strategies under different non-compensatory constraints.  Dynamic strategies such as 
aspiration level strategies show advantages for this non-compensatory component 
without simple differences in final outcome distributional variability;  the same number 
of participants drop out of the study for the aspiration level decision strategy as the risk 
averse strategy.   
Under conditions similar to the initial evaluation of Prospect Theory (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981), where no intermediate risks are present but all risks are markedly 
larger, risk-averse behavior leads to certainty with respect to the final outcome, risk-
seeking behavior leads to a spread out final outcome distribution, and other static 
strategies still appear entirely symmetrical.  Aspiration level strategies capitalize on the 
advantages of having markedly larger risks.  Outcome trajectory strategies are limited in 
their effectiveness without intermediate risks. 
In the real world, decision-making takes place under a myriad of different 
contexts; it becomes increasingly difficult to understand which aspects of the decision 
environment are most important in determining strategy formation.  Based on our 
observations of simulated environments, aspiration levels show a clear advantage in 
many of the contexts where static strategies show no influence on final outcomes.  Hence 
we used an empirical test to determine if one aspect in particular (cumulative wealth) 
would be used as a determinant for risky choice by actual participants. 
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Study Three:  Empirical Investigation of Interaction between Situation and Context 
In addition to the simulations, this project includes an empirical investigation to 
elucidate which strategies might come closest to what people actually do.  First, I will 
address previous empirical work pertinent to the current approach. Then, the current 
empirical test is outlined, followed by a discussion of the various analyses and 
comparisons used for the empirical test. 
Pilot Empirical Work 
In addition to the simulations on risky choice, Schneider and colleagues have 
looked at two different tasks to examine how people’s risk preferences differ.  Schneider 
(2002) designed a decision paradigm mentioned earlier that may be preferable to the 
standard risky choice paradigm because it makes goal trajectory information more 
available to the participant.  To see how actual strategies may differ, the standard risky 
choice paradigm and the new goal-trajectory paradigm (ticket transfer task) are directly 
compared. 
In the passive “Choice” task, participants are shown two static lotteries and are 
asked to simply choose which of the two lotteries they prefer to play.  In the active goal-
trajectory paradigm (called the “Move” task from here on), participants are given a single 
lottery and are instructed that they are about to play the lottery.  Before playing, their task 
is to improve the lottery in one of two ways, both of which ultimately lead to the same 
choices in the Choice task.  In this paradigm, participants are either instructed to actively 
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increase or decrease the amount of risk they are exposed to (Figure 12) if they are in the 
move condition, or they are subjected to the standard passive choice task in which 
participants choose between two lotteries that vary in the amount of risk (Figure 13). 
The active goal seeking paradigm was invented by Schneider to “situate” decision 
makers in a given decision environment.  With passive choice, people are just looking at 
two different options, and there is no context with respect to how these lotteries relate to 
their goals or activities.  However using the Move task, participants are given context 
about the choice, and are asked to make a change in their current situation to influence 
future outcomes.  Schneider’s Move task combines aspects of situated cognition by 
attributing a decision context and then allowing participants to exert some control over 
the potential outcomes. 
 
Figure 17: Ticket Transfer Paradigm-Move Example Diagram.  In Ticket Transfer paradigm, 
participants are asked to actively change the amount of risk in a given lottery.  The arrows are meant 
to represent the possible ticket moves.  
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Figure 18: Ticket Transfer Paradigm-Choice Example Diagram.  This is an example of the Ticket 
Transfer paradigm task that calls on participants to passively choose one of the two possible lotteries 
for a given lottery pair. 
In her first investigation of the Ticket Transfer paradigm phenomenon, Schneider 
and colleagues (2005) compared risk preferences for lotteries that were positive and 
negative using the Choice and Move tasks.  Using the Choice task, Schneider replicated 
the preference patterns predicted by the S-shaped value function of Prospect Theory. 
Specifically, when both possible outcomes were monetary gains, participants were more 
likely to choose the less risky choice option, and when both possible outcomes were 
monetary losses, participants were more likely to choose the more risky choice option 
(shown in Figure 14). 
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Figure 19: Risk preference by Valence for the Choice task in Previous Research.  The higher on the 
Y-axis, the more participants there were who exhibited risk-seeking behavior in that valence. 
 
However, when participants were given the Move task, their responding was not 
consistent with the S-shaped value function.  Specifically, participants were 
predominantly risk averse throughout (shown in Figure 15).  Schneider and colleagues 
argue that by providing the decision maker with a situated decision task involving 
outcome trajectory information, the decision makers are in a better position to understand 
the meaning of risk and to deal with it in a manner characteristic of other goal-related 
activities.  This enhanced understanding leads to preference patterns that are markedly 
different from Prospect Theory predictions and more consistent with standard intuitions 
of how to deal with risk.   
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Figure 20: Risk preference by Valence comparison of Move vs. Choice tasks from Previous Research. 
The higher on the Y-axis, the more participants there were who exhibited risk-seeking behavior in 
that valence. 
 
In an extension of this study to non-monetary outcomes, Schneider and colleagues 
(2005b) used “health units” as lottery outcomes, and told participants that these units are 
meant to represent decisions about improvements or detriments to current health.  This 
adaptation using “health units” was meant to contextualize the Ticket Transfer task 
beyond the use of simple monetary outcomes.  Schneider and colleagues (2005b) found 
the same pattern of preference reversal for the Choice task, and the same lack of 
preference reversal for the Move task. 
In a third manipulation, Schneider and colleagues (2006) added a component to 
the Ticket Transfer tasks (both Move and Choice) such that the lotteries actually played 
and participants were paid some multiple of their winnings.  Given this new capability, 
Schneider and colleagues (2006) developed what is essentially a “trajectory” 
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manipulation, such that half of the participants would start off with less in their initial 
“capital,” but would have an overall positive experience up to the status quo, while the 
other half of the participants would start off with more, but would have an overall 
negative experience down to the status quo.   
From this goal trajectory manipulation, Schneider and colleagues (2006) found 
that there were no substantive differences in risk preference given the different trajectory 
conditions (though the standard choice versus move differences were replicated); 
however, participants were asked affect questions about how they were feeling at the 
beginning of the study and about how they were feeling at the end of the study.  The 
responses to these affect questions showed an overall improvement in mood for the 
positive trajectory condition, and an overall deterioration in mood for the negative 
trajectory condition.  This shows the importance of long-term considerations such as 
“trajectories” are important because they impact individual participant experiences.  
Because these long-term considerations are often overlooked in standard risky choice 
tasks, we plan to extend the usage of accumulation and experiential outcomes into the 
more fully contextualized micro-world described previously.   
In summary, participants seem to have different patterns of risk preference 
depending on whether they are shown a task which requires only passive choices between 
two static options or are shown a task which engages them in self-initiated action to 
improve the value of the outcomes in a given situation.  This suggests participants are 
sensitive to being ‘situated’ in risky environments as opposed to simply being provided 
with static choices.  
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Methods for Empirical Study 
The purpose of our current empirical study is to examine the importance of 
various decision criteria across these two different decision tasks (the passive Choice task 
and the active Move task) with respect to risk preferences.  Participants completed either 
the Move task or the Choice task.  In addition, to incorporate the inclusion of time-
dependent contextual information, several dynamic contextual cues were made available, 
specifically (a) results of each of the plays of the selected lottery, (b) current actualized 
wealth and (c) wealth reflected as “social status” at various intervals.  These dynamic 
contextual cues exist to provide additional information for participants to potentially use 
in guiding their decisions, as this type of dynamic information is often available in the 
real world.  Also, participants were provided with noncompensatory elements, namely the 
requirement of keeping one’s current wealth above zero to avoid “going broke.” 
Participants 
202 undergraduate psychology students received extra credit toward their course 
grade for participating in this laboratory session; 111 were shown the choice version, 
while 91 were shown the move version.  Due to our participant pool, the majority were 
female and between the ages of 18 and 22.  Of those, several participants were dropped 
from the analysis (16 from the Choice version and 17 from the Move version), as they 
failed to pass a short quiz, designed to test if they understood the task. 
Stimulus 
Participants were provided with lotteries that look the similar to the lotteries 
shown in figure 17 (excluding the arrows and the “OR”) and 18.  As discussed 
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previously, for the “Choice” task, participants passively choose between 2 two-outcome 
lotteries (figure 18), while for the “Move” task, participants start with a two-outcome 
lottery and improve one of the two outcomes (figure 17).  Each two-outcome lottery 
consists of outcomes which were either both positive (e.g., 50 & 100), both negative 
(e.g., -50 & -100), or mixed (some combination of positive values, negative values, or 
zero).  The two outcomes were separated by discrete intervals of ‘50’.  The largest 
disparity between any two outcomes was 3 intervals (‘150’). 
Design 
There were 4 orders in each condition, and all participants began with the same 
initial score.  This score served as a stand in for currency.  A higher score represent more 
currency.  Also, the expected value for the series of lotteries was kept consistent between 
all orders and with the simulation study.  There were 38 unique lotteries (from an 
expected value of ‘-250’ to ‘325’) and each lottery type was presented twice with a few 
exceptions4 for a total of 75 lotteries in each order.  
Each order consisted of 3 practice lottery pairs, 8 quiz questions, and 75 two-
ticket lotteries or lottery pairs, followed by several questions about the participant’s 
strategies regarding the lotteries and their status in the micro-world (to be discussed 
later).  In addition several questionnaires were used to gauge individual differences in 
risk preferences, namely Higgins’s Regulatory focus survey and Elke Weber’s risk 
tolerance survey. 
                                                 
4 So as to achieve a slight positive trajectory from the initial score of ‘600’ to the overall expected value of 
‘1000’, two of the most positive lotteries were not duplicated, and one of the negative lotteries was seen 
three times. 
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The Micro-world 
The task consists of a micro-world designed as an oversimplification of real-
world decision-making with respect to risk preferences.  Participants were provided with 
a series of forced-choice two-outcome lotteries, and the outcomes of those lotteries 
accumulated into a displayed value referred to as their “current wealth.”  This current 
wealth value or “score” represents the participant’s current socio-economic status in the 
micro-world.  Based on the simulation results5, we set an initial score of 600.  Current 
wealth was adjusted after each lottery was played based on the randomly determined 
outcome, similarly to the simulation study.   
In order to further contextualize the lottery playing task, a variety of information 
about quality of life relative to a participant’s current wealth was provided to participants 
at occasional intervals.  This information included a brief summary of the participant’s 
current living conditions as proportional their amount of current wealth (This information 
is outlined in Table 2).  The larger the participant’s current wealth, the richer that 
participant was considered to be.  As mentioned previously, participants receive feedback 
about their standing in the micro-world incrementally after every 5 lotteries throughout 
the experiment. 
The characteristics for the different levels of social status in the simulated micro-
world are designed to represent important real-life human concerns.  These characteristics 
include availability of nourishment, the quality of housing, social influence, level of 
monetary wealth and capital, and access to medical care.  Based on a participant’s current 
                                                 
5 We decided on 600 as an initial score in order to have some participants who would “go broke” in the 
study, but no so many as to negatively impact our results. 
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wealth, these characteristics changed at specific “milestones” or cutoff points.  Also, if 
one of these milestones was reached and a participant had zero or less than zero in their 
cumulative total, the participant was notified that they “died” in the simulated micro-
world, and they were directed to answer any final questions and leave the room early. 
Procedure 
A desktop computer was used to run the program, which consisted of either a 
series of pairs of lotteries as in the Choice task or a series of singular lotteries as in the 
Move task.  Participants were in one of two conditions; either they were asked to choose 
one of the lotteries to play (for the Choice task) or they were asked to choose one of the 
two ‘tickets’ (outcomes) to improve before the lottery played (for the Move task).  Once a 
selection had occurred, a random drawing took place, and the ‘winning’ outcome was 
displayed on screen before continuing to the next lottery.  After every 5 lotteries, 
participants were provided with the contextual feedback discussed earlier (an example is 
provided in Appendix B), or if their current wealth was at or below zero, they were 
informed of their demise and no more lotteries were provided.  Once participants finished 
all the lotteries, either by completing them or by “going broke,” they were asked several 
questions regarding their overall decision strategy, as well are their reasoning for why 
they would choose a particular type of lottery (for Choice) or ticket to improve (for 
Move).   
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Table 2: Summary of Social Status Indicators. 
 Residence Availability of 
Nourishment 
Method of 
transportation 
Monetary capital Medical coverage 
Destitute Subsidized in 
an unsafe 
neighborhood 
Severely 
limited 
Walk or public 
transit 
Limited to 
survival 
No medical 
coverage 
Lower Forced to 
share an 
apartment with 
others in 
mostly unsafe 
neighborhood 
Can maintain 
healthy eating 
but cannot 
afford 
restaurants 
Bike or 
moped, cannot 
afford car 
Most spent on 
living expenses, 
but some money 
can be saved 
Limited 
emergency 
medical coverage 
Lower 
middle 
Can afford 
own 
apartment, or 
share nicer 
house with a 
roommate in 
moderately 
safe 
neighborhood. 
Maintain 
healthy eating 
and restaurants 
a couple of 
nights a week 
Can afford 
Economy Car 
About half of 
money earned is 
spending money 
Partial medical 
coverage /HMO 
Upper 
middle 
Can afford 
own house or 
apartment in 
safe 
neighborhood 
Can eat at 
restaurants any 
time  
Can afford a 
nice car 
A large portion of 
money can be 
saved or invested 
in the future 
Full medical 
coverage 
Very 
Rich 
Can afford any 
house in 
completely 
safe 
neighborhood 
Personal chef 
and nutritionist 
Luxury vehicle Almost all of 
money can be 
saved or invested 
in the future 
Top notch health 
coverage and 
personal trainer 
Note: These were provided to participants in the empirical portion of the experiment. 
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Results of Empirical Study 
For the empirical investigation, the goal was to understand what types of 
contextual information people might be using when forming their personal risk 
preferences.  To do this, we present an analysis of the data starting from the simplest of 
possible risk strategies (Risk Policies) and investigate progressively more complex risk 
strategies.  After simple risk policy strategies, the next level of complexity focuses on 
static lottery characteristics, such as valence and variability.  The most complex strategies 
include aspiration levels and dynamic goal trajectory strategies.  We also explore 
differences between the Choice task and the Move task conditions at each level of 
complexity, as well as the implications that arise from participants “going broke.” 
Participants Who “Went Broke” 
For participants who were risk-seeking more than half of the time, the rate at 
which they “dropped out” of the study was 33%, while for participants who were risk-
averse more than half of the time, the rate at which they dropped out of the study was 
only 28%, which demonstrates that being risk-averse helps your chances to avoid going 
broke (confirming what was already shown definitely using the statistical simulations).  
Also, for participants who went broke using the risk-averse policy, the minimum number 
of trials or “life experiences” was 15 and the maximum number of trials was 65, whereas 
for the participants who were reliably risk seeking, the minimum was 10 and the 
maximum was 45.  Thus, participants who were predominantly risk averse generally 
outlived participants who were predominantly risk seeking. 
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Decision Strategy Comparison 
In addition to a comparison across different lottery characteristics (e.g., valence) 
and interpersonal characteristics (e.g., current wealth), tests were conducted to compare 
each participant’s risk preferences with simulated risk strategies.  This project uses the 
decision strategies simulated previously to work backwards and see if “actual” 
participants are making the same choices as an idealized “virtual” participant might 
respond under the same conditions.  This was done to get a better understanding of 
whether participants are reacting to specific contextual information from the decision 
environment at each of the different levels of complexity (basic risk policy differences, 
static lottery-dependent, wealth-focused/aspiration-based, goal trajectories). 
Strategy comparisons were conducted as follows:  For basic risk policy decision 
strategies, we simply had to look at the number of times a participant was risk-averse or 
risk seeking.  Static, lottery-dependent decision strategies focused on the valence of each 
lottery and the amount of risk in each lottery to determine their choices.  We just look at 
how the characteristics of the lotteries affect preferences.  For dynamic decision 
strategies such as the aspiration level strategies or the trajectory strategies, which require 
more robust contextual information, an analysis was done for each individual based that 
participant’s complete “decision environment.”  This “decision environment” included 
information specific to that individual (including which lotteries were presented, what 
previous outcomes they received, their current total at each trial, etc.); aspiration level 
decision strategies used the information about current wealth at each trial, and the goal 
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trajectory decision strategies used a running tally of information about previous outcomes 
at each trial. 
This analytical technique takes the same basic principle behind creating virtual 
participants from decision strategies.  However, instead of putting the virtual participants 
into their own unique environment (as with a randomly generated outcome), “virtual” 
participants are placed in the environment experienced by “actual” participants.  
Therefore, if an actual participant is using a particular decision strategy, then the risk 
preferences of the “virtual” participant would be the same as the risk preferences of the 
accompanying “actual” participant. 
The number of participants who were best predicted by a particular decision 
strategy type is presented at each level of complexity, and comparisons between 
difference strategies are discussed with reference to Table 3.  In the case of a tie (two or 
more strategies predicting a participant with the same accuracy), we used parsimony and 
credit was attributed to the simpler of the two decision strategies.  The samples for each 
task type only reflect participants who had complete decision environments (i.e., 
participants who “went broke” were not included). 
Table 3: Percentage of Participants Predicted by each Decision Strategy Type. 
  Risk 
Aversion 
Risk 
Seeking 
Prospect 
Theory 
Risk As 
Threat 
Modest 
Variance 
Asp. 
Levels 
Goal 
Trajectories 
% Best 
Predicted 
Choice (n = 63) 32% 18% 11% 10% 3% 14% 13% 
Move (n = 53) 43% 9% 2% 21% 11% 4% 9% 
Avg. Best 
Prediction 
Choice (n = 63) 79% 80% 69% 61% 67% 66% 69% 
Move (n = 53) 82% 73% 65% 69% 72% 66% 76% 
Note: % Best Predicted represents the proportion of participants (excluding those who ‘went broke’) 
whose preferences were most accurately predicted by the given decision strategy.  The average best 
prediction represents the proportion of actual responses that were accurately predicted for 
participants who were best predicted for the given decision strategy.   
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Simple Differences in the Amount of Risk 
There was an overall tendency towards risk aversion for both the Move and 
Choice task.  For the Choice task, participants took risks an average of 45% of the time 
and for the Move task, participants took risks an average of 36% of the time.  As shown 
in Table 3 (p. 62), when the risk preferences of actual participants were compared to 
simulated risk policies for the Choice task, 32% of participants were best predicted by the 
risk-averse strategy while 18% were best predicted by the risk-seeking strategy.  For 
Move, 43% of participants were best predicted by the risk-averse strategy, while 9% were 
best predicted by the risk-seeking strategy.  In addition, on average for both Move and 
Choice, risk policy strategies predicted roughly 80% of actual responses, compared to the 
other decision strategies which all predicted roughly 65-70% of actual responses, with the 
exception of risk seeking in the Move task.  This shows that simple risk policy strategies 
have the largest margin of prediction for actual participant responding, likely due to their 
simplistic nature.  In addition, risk aversion tends to be a more predominant strategy for 
the situated Move task than for the passive Choice task. 
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Risk Preferences as a Function of Lottery-Dependent Characteristics 
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Figure 21: Comparison of previous and current Move v. Choice data. 
 
To look for differences with respect to valence, and to see if our results are 
consistent with previous findings, Figure 21 shows the comparison of the current data 
from the Move task and Choice task with previous versions of the Choice task and Move 
task.  Note that for both Choice and Move, there appears to be a substantial reduction in 
the number of risks taken for the negative lotteries, as well as a general ‘middling’ of risk 
preferences effect across all the valences (fewer risks taken/avoided where there used to 
be a large majority).  The substantial reduction in the number of risks taken may have had 
something to do with the potential for participants to “go broke,” as avoidance of this 
noncompensatory element would suggest an increase in risk-averse behavior and was not 
included in previous manipulations. 
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The simulation comparison for decision strategies that use static lottery 
characteristics (specifically, decision strategies similar to the Prospect Theory model or 
Risk as Threat model) allowed us to see if different individuals were using a consistent 
strategy that focused on the valences of the lotteries or the amount of variability between 
the outcomes in the lotteries.  As discussed in Study 1, the Prospect Theory decision 
strategy produces risk-seeking behavior for lotteries with all negative outcomes and risk-
averse behavior for lotteries with either all positive outcomes or a mix of positive and 
negative outcomes.  The Risk as Threat decision strategy exhibits risk-seeking behavior 
for lotteries with all positive outcomes and risk-averse behavior for lotteries with either 
all negative outcomes or a mix of positive and negative outcomes.  The Modest Variance 
decision strategy exhibits risk-seeking behavior when there is the potential for a riskless 
or “sure thing” outcome, otherwise exhibiting risk-aversion.  The percentage of 
participants who were best predicted by these strategies is shown in Table 3 (p. 62). 
For Choice, the effectiveness of the Prospect Theory-based decision strategy at 
predicting actual participant responding for choice is the same as the predictive 
effectiveness as the Risk As Threat-based decision strategies (10%).  For Move, Prospect 
Theory only predicts 2% of the participants, while the Risk as Threat decision strategy 
predicts 19% of the participants.  This suggests the differences articulated in Schneider 
(2002, 2005) are indeed correct; Prospect Theory does not adequately account for 
decision making with respect to risk when under Choice task conditions and Prospect 
Theory does even worse at attempting to account for decision-making with respect to risk 
when dealing with the active Move task.  In addition, the Modest Variance decision 
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strategy was a worse predictor for Choice than for Move.  This suggests that passively 
choosing between two options when one of them is riskless (e.g., Choice) does not have 
the same impact on avoiding riskless options as being forced to actively configure a 
riskless option (e.g., Move). 
Risk Preferences as a Function of Current Wealth. 
Because participants may be using information related to their individual current 
wealth, we investigated individual risk preferences at each wealth level in both Move and 
Choice.  Instead of simply averaging across each wealth level for all participants, we 
wanted to reflect patterns of behavior at each wealth level, and so first made sure that a 
participant spent a substantial amount of time at a particular wealth level before their risk 
preferences contributed to the analysis.  This was to account for the fact that not all 
individuals saw all the wealth levels for a prolonged period of time; it wouldn’t make 
sense to compare people’s risk preferences about particular wealth levels if they weren’t 
spending a significant amount of time there.   
First, the amount of time a participant spent at each wealth level was tabulated.  
Then for all the participants who spent a large enough amount of time at each particular 
wealth level (more than 5 trials), their individual ratios of risk preferences (percentage of 
risk-seeking behavior) were averaged within each participant and then across each wealth 
level. The amount of risk seeking behavior at each wealth level is shown in Figure 22. 
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Figure 22: Individual Risk Attitudes at each Wealth Level.  ‘N’ is the number of participants who 
had more than 5 responses at the given wealth level. 
 
Figure 22 shows that when individual risk preferences are evaluated across wealth 
levels, the pattern of risk seeking for Choice steadily increases as participants have a 
higher current wealth level, whereas the pattern of risk seeking for Move steadily 
decreases as participants have a higher current wealth level.  Because there are a different 
number of individuals at each wealth level and different individuals spent different 
amounts of time at each wealth level, the variances are not homogenous, so a statistical 
comparison of these groups would not be prudent.   
To better capture the potential individual usage of current wealth levels, a 
comparison of actual participants’ risk preferences and virtual participants imbued with 
decision strategies focused on current wealth was analyzed.  As discussed in Studies 1 
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and 2, an aspiration level strategy predicts that a participant exhibits risk-averse behavior 
until their current wealth exceeds a particular goal or “cutoff” point, whereupon that 
participant exhibits risk-seeking behavior until the current wealth falls below their goal.  
To see if participants were focused on specific current wealth levels, several different 
“cutoff” point values were utilized.  The percentage of actual participants who were 
found to be best predicted by the aspiration level decision strategies across all of these 
various cutoffs are shown in Table 3 (p. 62). 
There were several participants for Choice (and many fewer for Move) who were 
best predicted by aspiration level strategies, which suggests that something is going on in 
Choice that makes current wealth more salient as a decision criterion than for Move.  
There were other participants whose preferences resemble with both aspiration level 
decision strategies and risk policies.  As an aspiration level decision strategy had a 
progressively lower cutoff value (e.g., 775), the participants who were consistent with it 
were also consistent with the risk seeking risk policy.  The same held true for higher 
cutoff values (e.g., 1225) and the risk-averse risk policy.  This makes establishing 
whether a participant was using current wealth as a criterion or just a simple risk policy 
quantitatively difficult to differentiate. 
To provide for the notion that participants formed their individual risk preferences 
using current wealth and not just a simple risk policy, the self-report style questions 
asked directly to participants about their overall strategy were analyzed.  Participants 
were asked direct confidential questions at the end of the lottery series about their 
individual decision strategy.  When participants were asked, “What was your overall 
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strategy?” 19% of participants for the Move task responded with some mention of a 
cumulative total or current status as a predominant factor, while 52% responded with a 
similar strategy answer for the Choice task. 
Despite the overlap between risk policies and more complex dynamic decision 
strategies, aspiration level decision strategies that use specific “cutoff” values to switch 
between risk policies may not be the way participants are using current wealth.  
Participants are not told about the total range of current wealth states or the range of 
possible scores, so it would not be possible to effectively set cutoffs based on particular 
expectations.  However, for our simulations, accurate expectation information for the 
lotteries was known a priori to the design of the decision strategy.  The stochastic nature 
of the simulation procedure allowed us to optimize an aspiration level decision strategy in 
the general sense, since we knew what the overall expected value was; however, each 
participant is limited in the actual outcomes they will experience, and the range of values 
they have previously experienced is changing dynamically throughout the task.  
Therefore aspiration levels may be changing over time or they may be set with other 
factors in mind.  Trying to match their performance with fixed aspirations having cutoff 
points relative to information not explicitly given to participants isn’t a fair ‘litmus test’ 
of whether participants might have been using their current total in their decision-making. 
Instead of using a “cutoff point” to utilize current wealth, participants may, in the 
general sense, be taking more or less risks as their cumulative total increases.  To account 
for this potential utilization of current wealth, a point biserial correlation was performed 
for each participant to investigate potential within-subject relationships between current 
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wealth and risk preferences.  Participants who were entirely risk averse or entirely risk 
seeking were not included for obvious reasons.  Table 4 shows the pattern of results for 
these biserial correlations with positive correlations suggesting greater risk seeking at 
higher wealth levels. 
Table 4: Number of Participants for Point Biserial Correlation 
 Positive Significant Positive  Non-significant 
Negative  
Non-significant 
Negative 
Significant 
Choice (n = 89) 12* 37 35   5* 
Move (n = 72)   1* 22 36 13* 
 
While the vast majority of participants have non-significant correlations, there are 
many more positive significant correlations for Choice and many more negative 
significant correlations for Move.  The relationship between risk seeking behavior and 
current wealth explained here are consistent with the patterns shown in Figure 22.  This 
suggests that for Choice, when people are using current wealth in their decision-making, 
they do so by taking more risks as their current wealth increases, while for Move, when 
people using current wealth in their decision-making, they do so by taking fewer risks as 
their current wealth increases. 
Risk Preferences as a Function of Wealth X Valence 
Although we have shown there is evidence to suggest that current wealth plays a 
role in forming risk preferences, most of the research over the last several decades 
regarding risk preference patterns focuses on the importance of lottery valence.  As such, 
the interaction between wealth levels and valence for Choice is shown in Figure 23a, 
while the interaction between wealth levels and valence for Move is shown in Figure 23b.  
Each point represents the total proportion of risky choices across all the participants at 
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each particular wealth level for each valence.  No limiting procedure was used because 
all participants saw the same number of each type of lottery valence; so, in this context, 
wealth level is a byproduct of experience and homogeneity of variance across wealth 
levels cannot be assumed. 
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Figure 23a: Wealth Level by Valence for Choice Task.  The X axis indicates the proportion of risk-
seeking behavior for each wealth level at each valence. 
 
There are three noted points of interest for the Choice by Wealth level by Valence 
interaction (Figure 23a); First, risk preferences for negative lotteries appear 
inconsistent/pattern-less, in that they fluctuate between risk aversion and risk seeking 
across all wealth levels; Second, when participants are ‘poor’, they exhibit strong risk 
aversion when faced with a mixed lottery (N w/ P) or a choice between a sure gain and a 
risk that includes zero (P w/ 0); Third, when participants are at the “Rich” wealth level, 
they are compelled to take more risks when facing any of the lotteries which contain 
positive outcomes (N w/ P, P w/ 0, Sm POS, Lg POS) than another other wealth levels. 
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Figure 23b: Wealth Level by Valence for Move Task.  The X axis indicates the proportion of risk-
seeking behavior for each wealth level at each valence. 
 
 
Notable points of interest for the Move by Wealth level by Valence interaction 
(Figure 23b) are that preferences between valences seem relatively consistent across 
different wealth levels, with the potential exception of the “Rich” wealth level.  When 
comparing Figures 23a and 23b, it should be noted that the differences between wealth 
levels across valences are not the same for the Move task as the Choice task. 
Risk Preferences as a Function of Trajectory Information 
Another potential explanation for how participants may still be using dynamic 
information in a way that isn’t captured by the aforementioned comparisons of aspiration 
level strategies is that participants are sensitive to the overall changes in the trajectory of 
previous outcomes, but not necessarily in their current wealth value.  As shown in Study 
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1, trajectory decision strategies provide an analysis of “relative progress” based on 
sensitivity to subtle changes in outcomes over the short term and/or long term.   
The trajectory decision strategies compared with “actual” participants work the 
same way they were described in Study 1 (p. 26 and 27), inferring a risk preference from 
a majority of previous outcomes evaluated as the “better” outcome or the “worse” 
outcome.  “Continuation” type trajectory strategies infer that a majority of “better” 
outcomes leads to the conclusion that outcomes will continue to be good, and hence 
exhibits risk-seeking behavior, while “Discontinuation” type trajectory strategies infer 
that a majority of “better” outcomes leads to the conclusion that outcomes will no longer 
continue to be good, and hence exhibits risk-averse behavior.  Each participant had their 
own “trajectory” depending on their individual previous outcomes.  The information for 
the comparison of these trajectory decision strategies as predictors of actual participant 
responding can be found in Table 3.  Only the “Continuation” version of the trajectory 
decision strategies was compared to actual participants because the “Continuation” 
version is fundamentally consistent with the goal-directed behavior of the aspiration level 
decision strategies.  Comparing only this version of trajectory strategies makes the 
predictability of aspiration levels and goal trajectories directly comparable.  Also, 
trajectory strategies that required a ‘super’ majority of previous outcomes (e.g., 5 out of 
7) as “better” to insight risk-seeking behavior were included in addition to the ‘weak’ 
majority (e.g., 4 out of 7) addressed in study 1 and 2, because actual participants may 
require a larger margin of previous outcomes be “better” before they are willing to take 
risks. 
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The effectiveness of trajectory decision strategies at predicting actual participant 
responding is comparatively high for both Move and Choice given the underlying 
assumptions that participants were using either the previous 7 outcomes or all of the 
previous outcomes.  Consequently, there are also more participants who are best 
predicted by trajectory strategies that use all previous outcomes than the trajectory 
strategies that use a limited number of previous outcomes, which suggests that 
participants may not overtly sensitive to subtle changes in trajectory over time, but may 
be sensitive to changes in long-run trajectory information.  Also, the comparatively high 
prediction of actual responses for the Move task (76%) suggests that participants who are 
using goal trajectory strategies do so more in a consistent manner. This may occur 
because there is less outcome information being displayed throughout the Move task, as 
there are only at most two values being shown in the task at any one given point in time. 
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Discussion of Empirical Study 
For the purpose of this investigation, we compared the results of the Move vs. 
Choice tasks with respect to risk preferences in the dynamic task environment.  We 
further compared those participant results to the patterns of responding found in 
simulations, taking into consideration the Move v. Choice task distinction.  When 
comparing Move v. Choice tasks, we investigated differences in responding depending 
on several levels of complexity in the decision environment: basic overall risk policy 
differences, risk preferences with respect to valence, risk preferences with respect to 
when the lotteries were presented in time, risk preferences with respect to current wealth, 
and risk preferences as they related to goal trajectories. 
Because the Choice task has a slightly higher tendency for risk seeking behavior 
than the Move task, it could be argued that something about the Move task and situating 
participants in the decision environment has an overall effect on their actions with respect 
to risk.  However there may very well be more complex factors mitigating those 
differences. 
Risk preferences with respect to valence in large part replicated the findings of 
Schneider and colleagues (2005).  Group differences indicated that the passive Choice 
task approximated the preference pattern outlined by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), 
while the active ‘Move’ task did not follow the pattern of preference.  The strength of the 
Prospect Theory pattern was less pronounced in our study than in previous 
manipulations, and may have been influenced by the addition of the noncompensatory 
“going broke” condition, which was not present in previous manipulations.  In addition, 
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when actual participants were compared to static, lottery dependent decision strategies, 
the Prospect Theory model was underwhelming in its ability to predict actual participant 
responding for both Move and Choice, while the Risk as Threat model performed 
relatively well especially for Move. 
Risk preferences at each wealth level had different patterns depending on task 
type; the Move task showed a weak tendency to decrease in risk-seeking behavior as 
wealth increased while the Choice task showed an overall tendency to increase in risk 
seeking behavior as wealth increased.  One interpretation is that participants under the 
Move task, who are actively improving the values of the outcomes, have feelings of more 
‘control’ over their situation, and attribute the increase in cumulative total to 
‘dispositional’ factors (e.g., they acquired a good score based on their skill at improving 
outcomes).  As a result, when they achieve a high current wealth state, they attempt to 
skillfully “hold on” to that high current wealth state by reducing risk.   
Choice, on the other hand, is the act of passively choosing between two lotteries, 
and may not necessarily lead participants to attribute their high score to dispositional 
factors, but rather to ‘situational’ factors (e.g., they acquired a good score based on 
random luck, a rigged game, etc.).  As a result, when they achieve a high current wealth 
state, they presume it must be some manner of random chance that got them to the higher 
current wealth state, or that they are lucky, and that continuing to take risks will supply 
them with even more wealth. This is all speculative however, and more investigation is 
required to understand participants’ explicit reasoning, particularly with respect to 
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whether there are differences in situational/dispositional attribution for the Choice/Move 
tasks. 
In addition, there are problems associated with assuming participants know more 
about what to “expect” from the lotteries than they actually do.   Participants have no 
contextual cues to give them a sense of the overall range of possible values in the short 
term, nor do they have accurate information about what they should expect in the longer 
term.  For future investigations, this problem might be solved by providing participants 
with information about what they can expect in the short term and long term before they 
begin to make decisions, or alternatively giving them more contextual information about 
a particular goal, to see if they set an aspiration level as a result.  This is because in the 
real world, people often have information about what to expect in the short term and long 
term (e.g., weekly salary) and have particular goals or noncompensatory requirements 
(e.g., cost of living expenses). 
For the purpose of this investigation, however, correlations were performed 
between individuals’ risk preferences and their current totals to see if participants 
generally change their risk preferences with respect to an overall increase or decrease in 
current wealth.  We found that several participants for the Choice task had a positive 
correlation between risk-seeking behavior and current total (e.g., as current wealth 
increased, participants were more risk-seeking) and several participants for the Move task 
had a negative correlation between risk-seeking behavior and current total (e.g., as 
current wealth increased, participants were more risk-averse).  This suggests the 
differences between the Choice and Move tasks may be meaningful within individuals 
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and are not just a byproduct of overall current wealth differences between individuals 
(e.g., people who were “doing well” the whole time exhibiting risk-seeking behavior 
while people who were “doing poorly” the whole time exhibiting risk-averse behavior).  
The self-report data suggests that several participants were identifying that their 
own decision strategies include a current wealth component.  Both tasks (Move and 
Choice) had a substantial percentage of participants respond using some reference to their 
“current state” in their explanation of their overall strategy.  The choice version shows 
more participants offering up this self-report response, which is actually consistent with 
the results found when comparing the task by wealth level by valence interaction (Figures 
23a/b). 
Specifically, when wealth level is aggregated within valences for both Move and 
Choice, differences between wealth levels seem to persist most strongly for the Choice 
task and further differences between the higher (Rich) and lower (Poor) wealth levels 
seem to apply almost entirely when participants are facing positive lotteries.  When 
participants are rich, they make more risky choices, and when participants are poor, they 
make more risk-averse choices.  This suggests participants are adopting a criterion 
similar to the Security-Potential/Aspiration strategy of Lopes (1987).  When poor, 
participants might be interpreting risks as security threats, and hence avoiding them, 
whereas when rich, participants might be interpreting risks as potential opportunities, and 
hence adopting them.  However, in the Move version, wealth levels aggregated within 
valences show no strong consistent differences.  This suggests that for Move, the risk 
preference pattern across valence is consistent at each current wealth level, which would 
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provide a reason for the overall effectiveness of lottery-dependent strategies, particularly 
the Risk as Threat decision strategy. 
The current wealth level analyses as a whole suggest that the Choice and Move 
tasks present decision information to participants such that current wealth is interpreted to 
mean two different things.  The Move task, which has been hailed by Schneider and 
colleagues (2005, 2006) as a way to situate participants into improving outcomes in an 
active, goal-seeking manner, may invoke additional contextual information (e.g., situated 
risk) which influences risk preferences, potentially to the detriment of other more 
important contextual factors (e.g., current wealth as a measure of long-run progress).  The 
passive Choice paradigm, on the other hand, is one in which wealth levels were able to 
make an impact on risk preferences. 
The data also suggests that without provocation or manipulation, the participants 
in the Choice condition who did end up using the wealth levels as a criterion for risky 
choice, did so in a manner such that the long run outcomes would be skewed to the right, 
resulting in an increase to the likelihood of ending up in the extreme higher end of the 
spectrum, a decrease to the likelihood of ending up in the extreme lower end of the 
spectrum.  The problem still exists, however, that lotteries in the negative valence were 
largely unaffected by the wealth level manipulation, and hence the usage of cumulative 
total as a criterion is seemingly limited. 
When instead of current wealth, participants were analyzed with respect to goal 
trajectory information (which consequently does not use specific fixed cutoff points), a 
moderately sized portion of participants were consistently predicted as using one of these 
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strategies for both Move and Choice.  The usefulness of trajectory strategies in 
circumstances where the overall range of values is not known was discussed in Studies 1 
and 2, and it is surprising that participants were found to be consistent with this type of 
decision strategy, given the number of assumptions required to assert it. 
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General Discussion 
Vantage point dependencies, aspirations, and goal dependencies were investigated 
in a number of different ways to provide insight into how people make decisions in 
heavily contextual external world.  Study 1 used statistical simulations to investigate how 
each of these contextual factors from the external world might affect long run outcome 
distributions.  Overall, these simulations provided us with a means to find out about 
idealized strategies for making risky choices.  We investigated if and how decision 
strategies that use dynamic and time-dependent criteria such as aspiration levels and goal 
trajectories are advantageous in the probabilistic sense.  We found that aspiration levels 
and goal trajectories are advantageous because they provide some way of gauging one’s 
current position relative to the “average” or expected position. 
The ability to skew the long-run distribution (in either direction) is something 
“static” strategies simply cannot do.  In many real-world contexts, using a dynamic 
strategy can provide an advantage over a static strategy.  In fact, there is no case in which 
a dynamic strategy is suboptimal to a static strategy if used appropriately, because every 
dynamic strategy is at its core essentially the concatenation of two or more static 
strategies using some dynamically-acquired value that is a rough measure of progress-
thus-far in the decision environment. 
Study 2 placed the decision strategies from Study 1 and from the pilot simulation 
into several variations on contextualized decision environments.  We showed that under 
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different contexts, the effectiveness of different decision strategies may change, but that 
the core reasons why dynamic decision strategies can be advantageous over static 
decision strategies still persist. 
Study 3 was designed to find out which types of decision strategies people are 
actually using.  As a result of the overwhelming long-run benefits from using dynamic 
criteria found in studies 1 and 2, we hypothesized there would be evidence that 
participants use the provided dynamic criterion (cumulative total) in strategic way.  We 
found that while participants appear to have systematic differences in risk preferences 
with respect to dynamic and time-dependent criteria, there is not an overwhelming usage 
of dynamic decision strategies over other decision strategies. Nevertheless, our results 
may underestimate the use of dynamic criteria, as it is much more difficult to specify 
exactly how these criteria might be used and how the criteria may be changing over time. 
Risk Policy strategies are the simplest possible decision strategy, where either 
risk-averse behavior or risk seeking behavior are predominant throughout.  Differences 
between simulated risk policy decision strategies are limited to differences in variability 
for the outcome distribution; risk-aversion has a narrow distribution and risk-seeking has 
a spread out distribution.  Simple risk policies were the most commonly used decision 
strategy for both Move and Choice, particularly the risk-averse decision strategy. 
Lottery-based strategies use lottery-dependent vantage point information, 
specifically the valence of the potential outcomes (as with the Prospect Theory and Risk 
as Threat decision strategies) or the respective difference between the potential outcomes 
(as with the Modest Variance decision strategy).  For simulated lottery-based decision 
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strategies, there were no differences in the long run outcome distributions aside from 
different amounts of spread.  In the empirical study, the efficacy of Prospect Theory as a 
predictor of actual behavior was extremely poor. The Modest Variance strategy and the 
Risk as Threat strategy didn’t do much better, especially in the Choice task. 
Aspiration level strategies and goal trajectory strategies each use contextual cues 
from the decision environment that are time-dependent and constantly-updating.  
Simulations of these dynamic decision strategies showed a specific change in the shape 
of the outcome distribution via the addition of skew.  The skew in the outcome 
distribution articulates that these strategies have the capacity to influence one’s long-run 
results in ways static lottery-dependent decision strategies cannot.  Also, the predictive 
strength of these dynamic decision strategies is somewhat surprising, considering the 
large number of assumptions required to assert them.  Also, there are substantial task 
differences, with the Choice task having a larger portion of participants who used an 
aspiration level decision strategy as consistent with the goals addressed in Schneider and 
colleagues (2007) compared to the Move task. 
The usage of current wealth as a criterion was more pronounced in the Choice 
version of the task possibly because the elements of the Move version that appear to 
require skill outweigh any other strategic planning.  By asking participants to improve 
outcomes for each lottery, participants are presumably led to believe that risky choice can 
be skillfully mastered, and current wealth isn’t used as a measure of progress in the task, 
but as a measure of skillful mastery at the task.  The Choice version, however, does not 
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include elements which might be interpreted as requiring ‘skill’, and is perhaps more 
open to allowing current total to be used as an inference about future goals. 
These task differences have been shown to influence which types of contextual 
information from the environment are being used to formulate decision strategies.  This 
experiment studied these task differences in isolation, but the two tasks described herein 
have strong implications for the real world.  Decisions that are presented in the passive 
form of static choice have markedly different real world implications than decisions that 
are presented in the active form of initiating progress. 
So the pros associated with presenting a decision in its passive form is that 
participants are likely to be more receptive to the external context, with the downside that 
they are not as situated in the individual risky environments.  Presenting a decision in its 
active form has the benefit of providing a realistic context for each individual decision, 
even though some external context may not be as salient. 
It has also been shown that people are in fact using dynamic information when 
making decisions, and by comparing different decision strategies, we provide evidence 
for which strategies make better predictors.  Risk aversion is the best predictor of 
decision making, which is consistent with the most fundamental principles of utility 
theory from Bernoulli (1738/1954).  Aside from that, lots of different decision strategies 
are being used for both Move and Choice; although some are used more in the Choice 
task and others are more frequent in the Move task. Trying to establish a single best 
predictive decision strategy was not accomplished, nor necessarily should it. 
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Nevertheless, it appears as though the interpretation of “risk” as something to be 
avoided is highly predictive among actual participant responding, especially when risk 
corresponds to everyday notions like “danger” or “threat.”  Thinking of safety from risk 
is a commonality in this respect.  One could consider that decision strategies which 
exhibit entirely risk-averse behavior throughout or include a component of risk-aversion 
when one’s current vantage point or future outlook are poor or negative as this type of 
“avoiding” risk.  The risk-aversion policy, the Risk as Threat strategy, Aspiration Level 
decision strategies and “Continuation” Goal Trajectory strategies all exhibit this notion of 
avoiding risk.  When all those are taken into account, over 75% of participants’ strategies 
are accounted for by the notion of avoiding risk. 
Of those decision strategies, several include an additional component for taking 
risks when one’s vantage point or future outlook are good.  The Risk as Threat strategy, 
the aspiration level strategies, and the “Continuation” goal trajectory strategies all include 
this notion of seeking risk as well as avoiding risk.  Of the 75% of participants who 
predominantly avoid risk, about half were also riskier when their vantage point or future 
outlook was good. 
By comparing different decision strategies, we have shown that there are long-run 
statistical advantages and disadvantages to using different types of contextual information 
in the environment (static vs. dynamic).  It may seem reasonable to base one’s decision 
making on the lottery environment (e.g., valence); however, strategically speaking, if 
one’s goal is to give oneself a long-run advantage, focusing on where one is and where 
one wants to go from there (e.g., dynamics) is the best way to go, as long as the options 
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your are provided with have the same monetary expected value.  How one comes to know 
their “current status” can be achieved either by cues provided about one’s current status 
or by observing outcomes to see one is doing well relatively speaking.  In addition, the 
exhaustive investigation of aspiration level simulations and goal trajectory simulations 
provides evidence that having a meaningless or uneducated ‘goal’ will not provide one 
with the same type of long-run advantage as having a meaningful or accurate goal might.  
We found that as an ‘aspiration’ becomes more appropriate to what can be best expected 
and as a trajectory includes a larger margin of previous experiences, there is better 
control over the long-run probability distribution, specifically the amount and direction of 
skew in the long-run outcome distribution.  However, if one’s implicit goals are to tend 
towards a specific risk policy (e.g., remain predominantly risk-averse), aspiration level 
decision strategies can use an adjusted cutoff point to reflect a general tendency towards a 
risk policy (e.g., increasing the cutoff point for one’s aspiration level strategy tends 
towards risk-aversion), and goal trajectory decision strategies can require a stronger or 
weaker majority to reflect a general tendency towards a risk policy (e.g., requiring a 
stronger majority of “better” outcomes before one is willing to take risks tends towards 
risk-aversion). 
More research is required to determine the driving force between the differences 
in the Move and Choice tasks.  Though our study provided additional insight into 
differences with respect to Move and Choice, we have yet to provide a systematic 
explanation of why those differences exist.  In addition, our study was limited in its 
investigation of the potential influence on decision-making by dynamic criteria because 
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of the large number of assumptions regarding cutoff points and implicit goals.  Future 
studies will do well to develop additional potential methods for investigating the impact 
of current wealth levels on risky choice using a more systematic manipulation.  Also, the 
empirical results suggest that the dynamic decision making perspective might provide 
some additional insight in understanding risk preferences for choices that require actual 
skill or ability that can improve over time by using the Choice v. Move task 
manipulation. 
Most importantly, since the predictability of actual participant preferences is 
spread out across multiple decision strategies and different levels of decision complexity, 
attempting to evaluate all decision making with respect to risk through a single contextual 
cue or piece of the decision environment is shortsighted.  More research is required to 
determine what types of cues are commonly used by individuals, but not necessarily for 
the purpose of finding a single unifying decision strategy that predicts all behavior. 
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Appendix A:  Quiz Sample 
 
ID Number:____________________                          _________________ 
 
-
$50         
-
$50         
-
$50         
-
$50         
-
$50 $0       
-
$50 $0       
-
$50 $0 $50     
-
$50 $0 $50
$10
0   
-
$50 $0 $50
$10
0 $150 
 
Do you have a better chance of drawing a ticket worth $0 or $100? ____________ 
 
If you played this lottery over and over, on average, what ticket value would you 
draw only 3 out of every 20 times? __________________________ 
 
If you were given the chance to randomly draw a ticket from this lottery, which 
ticket value would you be least likely to draw? ________________________ 
 
In this lottery, do you have a better chance of drawing a winning ticket or a losing 
ticket?     _________________________ 
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-$100       $100 
-$100       $100 
-$100       $100 
-$100 -$50   $50 $100 
-$100 -$50 $0 $50 $100 
-$100 -$50 $0 $50 $100 
 
In this lottery, what value is the least likely outcome? ______________________ 
 
 
In a single play of this lottery, do you have a better chance of drawing a ticket with 
the value of $100 or -$50? _________________ 
 
 
What is the best possible outcome that you could expect in playing this lottery one 
time? __________________ 
 
 
How many tickets would result in your losing money? __________________ 
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Appendix B: Social Status Example 
  
